THEOLOGY

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EDITED BY E. G. SELWYN, B.D.

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THEOLOGY

A Monthly Journal of Historic Christianity

Edited by the Rev. E. G. Selwyn, B.D., Redhill Rectory, Havant, to whom all editorial matters should be addressed.

Vol. XII JANUARY, 1926 No. 67

EDITORIAL

To all our readers we wish a Happy New Year. During the last few months new undercurrents of wisdom and hope have made themselves felt in human affairs; and the Locarno treaty, the Irish settlement, and the efforts to give better embodiment to the spirit of fellowship in industry, have been welcomed as more full of promise for the future than any events since the war. Finally, the Mosul award has shown afresh how the League of Nations is giving Europe a public conscience, and its acceptance by our Government in the face of an unscrupulous Press campaign gives profound satisfaction to all who value national honour and the Christian name. In the course of the year now opening we may expect a resolute effort to be made by our leaders in the Church of England to take this same tide of constructive wisdom and guide it with cleansing and invigorating effect through our forms of public worship.

Lent will soon be upon us, and those who endeavour to make that season an opportunity of special reading could not do better than settle down to Dr. Lowther Clarke's edition of *The Ascetic Works of St. Basil.** Scholars appear to have passed on it a quite unanimous verdict as a work greatly needed and admirably done. But it would be a mistake to suppose that it is mainly a scholar's book. On the contrary, it is a book which touches the life of the simple Christian and the work of the parish priest at numberless points. In short, it is a book of practical devotion, and lends itself to being used as such. And if it be urged that its contents were addressed in the first instance to monks, the answer is that the same is true of the *Imitation*, which yet is for all who run.

* S.P.C.K. 1925. 12s. 6d.

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THE SERVANT POEMS IN THE DEUTERO-ISAIAH*

THE fourth and last of the Servant poems surpasses the earlier ones in interest and depth of feeling. Whatever be the meaning they had for contemporary readers they present as a whole a most extraordinary and amazing anticipation of the preaching, suffering, humiliation, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. It is not that certain phrases seem predictions of events in His life, and certain attributes or experiences of the Servant were exactly and precisely realized in Him: it is in the completeness of the delineation, in the faithful fulfilment as a whole of the rôle of Jehovah's faithful suffering servant that the miracle of coincidence or the miracle of prophecy lies.

Leaving for a time all questions of interpretation, we will see for ourselves exactly what is said of the Servant. In the last poem he had appealed to God's tribunal, asserting that the end of his enemies was certain in the natural course of earthly decay. God in answer now proclaims his ultimate success and certain exaltation. There follows a moving account of the Servant's undeserved misery and suffering which he bore with resignation and without support from any friend. Evidently from the earliest times there has been doubt as to who is the speaker or narrator here. R.V. rightly translates the Hebrew "Like as many were astonied at *thee*," from which it would seem to follow that the speaker is Jehovah. But the Syriac version and the Targum read "*at him.*" He was a person whose face and figure were repulsively ugly; but, nevertheless, he will startle the kings of the Gentiles by the force of his message. They will be compelled to listen to things unheard of before. Someone then reviews the Servant's career from lowly origin, without advantages of a handsome presence, to death through a miscarriage of justice. Yet it was God's will that he should die, for in some mysterious way he bore the sins of others and is able to make intercession for them.

The impression these verses make on the reader is certainly that of an individual suffering. Indeed, any other interpretation can only be obtained by an alteration in the text of verse 8.†

* The following study forms three lectures delivered to the Central Society of Sacred Study in Oxford on July 14-16, 1925. Much was necessarily left unsaid—*e.g.*, as to the historical situation, the earnest expectation of the coming kingdom, etc. But the object of the lectures was to serve as an indication of lines of study—not to present an exhaustive thesis.

† We may note here how exegetes are swayed by their theories. Peake on 49^4 says of the word *Israel*, "There is no solid reason for assuming it to be a gloss, unless we adopt the view that the servant is an individual" (p. 46), but he does not hesitate to insert it in 52^{13} in place of yaskīl, where it is the first verb of a climax.

To return to a more detailed study:

"My servant shall *prosper*" (R.V. marg.) is almost certainly the right rendering; his exaltation is to be exceeding great, corresponding to the depth of his humiliation. It is interesting to notice that the same verbs are used to describe the Servant's coming exaltation as are used by Isaiah to describe his vision of Jehovah; and again of Jehovah in lvii. 15, "The high and lofty one." Just as many have felt amazement at his appearance, for his face and form were repellent by reason of his sufferings, so he shall cause universal astonishment by his message. (I need not pause over the explanation of this verse. Read "*startle*" [R.V., marg.] for "sprinkle," which is an entirely erroneous translation.) It is when we come to the beginning of chapter liii. that diversity of interpretation is again strong. Who are they who exclaim, "Who could have believed that which we have heard?" According to some they are the Gentile kings breaking into speech after their dumb amazement. But if "my people" in verse 8 is not to be manipulated into "peoples," this suggestion falls to the ground.

The Servant possessed no natural advantages. He grew up in an unpropitious soil devoid of beauty and majestic appearance. Men despised him and left him alone. He suffered pains and sickness, and his appearance was so awful that men hid their faces from him, holding him of no account. But now his people see the inner significance of his suffering. "Surely it was *our* sicknesses *he* bore and our pains that he carried." Suffering was attributed to antecedent sin, as we see from the Book of Job and the questions addressed to our Lord on the subject. The prophet marks a tremendous advance when he pictures the Servant bearing the penalties of the sins of others, "while *we* accounted him stricken, smitten of God and afflicted." It has been suggested by many recent writers that by stricken נָגוּעַ, we are to understand "by leprosy." But there is really no reason why we should. The verb is not followed, as it generally is elsewhere, by the word leprosy; it is often used of God smiting men with any sudden sickness, but more especially by some inexplicable disease. It is precisely this latter thought which is emphasized in the expression "smitten of God"—that is, struck down by something mysterious. It is extraordinarily difficult to believe that a leprous figure could have been chosen as the ideal figure of a community wherein lepers were dreaded sources of infection, forbidden to associate with their fellows, and the object of a special section of the Law. Moreover, the Servant could not have been a leper unless we assume—and we have no right to assume—that he developed leprosy between the

time of his scourging and the plucking out of his beard, in the last poem, and his death. He could not have been touched or maltreated by men if he had been a leper. "Yet *he* was pierced because of our transgressions, crushed because of our iniquities." There would seem to be no doubt that the Servant in the prophet's mind was a man who suffered the double hardship of ill-health and the cruelty of men. Thus the *piercing* here would seem to refer to his death at the hands of men (*cf.* verse 8) rather than to the ravages of disease, just as the vicarious *stripes* or weals refer to the scourging already mentioned in l. 6. The Israelites, reflecting on the sight, confess that the chastisement necessary for their peace and well-being fell upon Him. The word מוּסָר in Hebrew is often used to denote the affectionate correction of God who, like a father, punishes not vindictively, but in order to train and develop the character of his child. The thought underlying this and the following verses is in germ that which Moberly so fully developed in his *Atonement*.

There is a flat contradiction between this poem and the Deutero-Isaiah speaking in xl. 2. "Speak ye comfortably to Jerusalem, and cry unto her that her time of service is accomplished, that her iniquity is pardoned; that she hath received of the Lord's hand double for all her sins." In the Deutero-Isaiah the thought is that Israel has expiated his guilt by suffering double as much as he deserved. In our poem it is the Servant who brings peace to the nation through his voluntary endurance in suffering for righteousness' sake. There is so violent a contrast between the ideas that even if we had not found reasons for believing that the Servant poems were the work of another prophet, we should have to think so now. Our verse is fatal to the national theory in its unqualified form. In the view of all the earlier prophets, Israel had justly suffered for his sins. None had pointed that fact out with greater frankness, nay, ferocity, than Ezekiel, who was probably a contemporary of the Servant's composer. All that happened to the nation the nation had richly deserved. But here, it is suggested, the opinion of the prophets, past, present and to come, is reversed and Israel is the innocent suffering for the guilty. No doubt in post-Christian times, when the unfortunate Jews were excluded from the Holy Land and subjected to all manner of insults and an invidious penal code, they were able to see themselves in this light. If this prophecy could be dated A.D. 200-800, it would be easy to see very considerable justification for the line of thought. But there is no such justification here. A theory that an idealized remnant of Israel is intended robs our objection of much of its force: but, nevertheless, it is strange that this ideal Israel should have

lain *perdu* so successfully in the national literature, and there are other objections to be discussed later.

The difference between the sufferings of the nation and the sufferings of the Servant is fundamental. The nation suffered because of its disobedience to Jehovah: the Servant because of his obedience. All his countrymen had wandered from the path of obedience like silly sheep, and Jehovah brought down upon the Servant the guilt of them all. Through these verses the emphasis and antithesis of the *we* and the *he* are everywhere marked, so that the sense is "*we*, not *he*, wandered from the right way, and *he*, not *we*, bore the guilt." No explanation of this vicarious atonement is offered by the writer except that it was the pleasure or will of God to save Israel and the world in this way. Verse 7 supplies the explanation of the Servant's fate. "He was oppressed, yet he humbled Himself," is a weak rendering. The word *niggas* implies harsh, tyrannous treatment as of a slave-driver, and is used of Pharaoh's foremen of labour gangs. "He was persecuted, he allowing himself to be humbled," is the most probable explanation of the Hebrew conjugation (so Dr. Driver). The Servant's suffering was voluntary: he could have escaped it by disobedience to God and refusal to deliver his message. But he chose to suffer without protesting. Like a lamb borne away to the slaughter: and like a sheep before her shearers.

A most unhappy ambiguity gathers around the following verse. As the details and reasons of the different explanations which have been offered would be clear only to Hebraists, I will merely cite the most probable.

1. R.V. By oppression and judgment he was taken away —*i.e.*, by a deliberate miscarriage of justice he was judicially murdered.

2. Without hindrance and without right; this can be objected to owing to the unparalleled meaning of the noun: otherwise it gives a very good sense.

3. From oppression and from judgment, as R.V., marg. —*i.e.*, he was released by God through death from the oppression of his fellows. However, it is rather pointless in an account of the Servant's sufferings to say that death was a happy release and then to say, "he was cut off out of the land of the living." It is more poignant to tell of the undeserved death of God's chosen servant. Therefore, the R.V. should probably be preferred.

"And as for his generation who *among them* considered that he was cut off," etc.

The second half of this verse is even more difficult to interpret. It is hardly possible to better the R.V., and yet it must be

accepted with some misgiving. "Generation" means "circle of contemporaries."

"For the transgression of my people was he stricken." As has been remarked above, this verse, as it stands, condemns the theory that the Gentiles are the speakers; and therefore it has been questioned. Quite unnecessarily—save for the exigencies of the theory—some critics have altered "transgression of my people" into "our transgressions." But there is no need to suspect the text. The LXX read "he was led to death," from which it has been inferred with good reason that the original reading was, "he was stricken to death"—*i.e.*, he met his death by violence. Some have seen in this a confirmation of their theory that the Servant died of leprosy. Quite apart from other considerations, it is unlikely that the death of a person who perished in so ordinary a way would be the theme of an inspired poet's verse or excite anything more than the contempt of his countrymen. The figure of the Servant made such a powerful impression on the Jews because he suffered at the hands of men, because he suffered for righteousness' sake. The poet has plainly described his humiliation and scourging following immediately after his commission to preach, and it is surely natural to suppose that the one is the result of the other. The hatred of his countrymen pursued him to the grave. He was buried with criminals, since the text implies that He was not given an ordinary burial with his relatives. The text reads: "and with the rich in his death." But it must be admitted that the text is a little doubtful. Parallelism would suggest that we should expect a word synonymous with wicked in the second half of the verse and, accordingly, many read, "osera" (evil-doers) for "ashir." This is probably right. Of course it cannot be asserted that the poet did not regard wicked and rich as synonymous. Such an identification is suggested in the New Testament and common in the Talmud.

It has been suggested that we should emend the latter half of the verse "and with evil-doers his sepulchral mound." Reject this. "Bāmah" is a high place used for worship and often furnished with an altar. The presence of a criminal's body on a bāma is surely impossible, and we have no right, without evidence, to assume that the word acquired such a changed meaning. I do not know if the suggestion has been made before, but I should read בְּמוֹתוֹ as an infinitive, not a noun. "And with the rich when he died." "Although he had done no violence, neither was any deceit in his mouth." This sums up the actual facts of the Servant's career so far as the prophet knew of them or conceived them. He was a perfect fulfilment of Jehovah's servant ordained and consecrated by the divine call. The

figure, if not intended to be a perfectly sinless one, is certainly approaching that ideal. His resignation to the Will of God in the face of persecution and death, and His innocence from all offence in deed and word, suggest an ideal rather than an actual person. It may be that the prophet is constructing his poem on the basis of known characters and even known works. If we may take an analogy from our own literature, we know how Shakespeare took up a current legend or belief or some old play and made it something so far transcending it that the lowly source of his ideas is scarcely recognizable. If coincidences in thought and language are an indication of dependence, there is some indication of a connexion between Jeremiah, the Servant, and Job. It would be extraordinary if the author of the Servant poems had not read the tragic history of Jeremiah and sympathized with his sufferings and unmerited hardships. And we know from Ezekiel that the main outlines of the story of Job were part of the popular tradition of his time. It is not impossible that a good deal of the sublime poetry of Job was known to many in the Exile. Thus we have two figures which could supply a good deal of material for the prophet's idealization. We think of Jeremiah saying: "I was like a gentle lamb that is led to the slaughter" (xi. 19), of Job writhing under the stroke of God and protesting his innocence. The poignancy and pathos of the Servant's suffering are not greater in degree than Job's. They are greater because of their underlying cause. The poet does not give us (save in the prologue) any real reason why Job suffered: there was no reason, apart from the application of the law of causation. But in the Servant poems the victim suffers voluntarily, first to do the will of God, and secondly, to bear in his person the punishment due to others. This is brought out most clearly in the next verse. The prophet has finished his description of the Servant's life and death, and in the following verses he shows the reason of the innocent suffering, and the beneficial result to the many. As so often in Hebrew prophecy, the voice of the prophet and the inner voice from God which he seeks to give tongue to alternately interchange and coalesce. I could give you many examples of such interchange and interplay of human reflection and inspired prophecy, the prophet first proclaiming Jehovah's message, continuing, as it were, in his own name, through the natural channel of his own mind, and then reverting to the first person of the divine speaker. So here, in verse 10, the prophet speaks as the interpreter of God's ways. These verses are not easy, though one wonders whether they would have been quite so hotly questioned had they not been the battleground of Jewish and Christian schools of interpretation. It was ever the method

of Dr. Driver to determine what the Massoretic text actually said, before resorting to emendation or alteration of any kind. He laid emphasis on the fact that the fragmentary survivals of ancient Hebrew literature do not always allow us to determine what language a prophet must have used, and only when grammar or the plain sense of the context is against a particular reading can we resort to emendation. The following verses do not violate the principles of Hebrew grammar, and though the LXX preserve a somewhat different text it does not necessarily follow that they are right:

"Yet it pleased Jehovah to crush him; making him sick. When (or if) thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see a seed, he shall prolong it: and the pleasure of Jehovah shall prosper in his hand."

The Servant's sufferings are part of the deliberate purpose of God. He brings justification to many by bearing their guilt and suffering the penal consequences. As the text stands the spiritual progeny of the dead Servant is made conditional upon his soul—*i.e.*, his life being made a guilt offering. The guilt offering, *'āshām*, is an infringement of the rights of others, for which a material compensation was demanded. The burden of guilt which the Servant bore is thought of as an infringement of God's rights, a sacrilege, which must be paid for. God has been outraged by the disobedience of the people who have wandered from the right way and the *'āshām*, the innocent Servant's life, is the satisfaction or price paid for that trespass. Now the whole subject of sacrifice is very much in the air nowadays. There are many who feel a strong repugnance towards it. Why cannot God forgive sin without asking for sacrifice? And if he must have a sacrifice, where is the justice in demanding the punishment of the innocent? This is a perversion of justice which would not be tolerated in an earthly court. How, then, are we to justify God if we are to believe that he acts thus? These are a few of the many modern objections to sacrifice. I cannot hope to answer these questions in a paper of this size, but I would ask you to look at the subject from the point of view of the Hebrews and from a general consideration of their theories of life and death. In the first place they saw the hand of God in everything far more clearly than we. Every happening of daily life, whether of the individual or of the nation, was attributed to the direct hand of God. There was little room for a theory of primary and secondary causes. Consequently, they saw no inconsistency in holding that the sufferings of the Servant were, in a sense, caused by Jehovah and yet inflicted

by men. At the same time, I should like to utter a caution against an unqualified assertion that the prophet thought of God as *causing* the Servant's miseries. The so-called *causative* conjugations in Hebrew sometimes mean no more than *allow* to happen, so that when it is said that Jehovah *caused* the iniquity or the guilt of all to light upon the Servant, it need not mean more than that Jehovah *allowed* their guilt to fall upon him. A similar thought and conjugation are to be found in the Quran, where Muhammad says that God *causes* men to err (*aḍalla*) where no more than *allows* to err is meant. The difference, of course, is important both for Old Testament and New Testament theology, and it goes back to the Hebrew conception of God working out His will in the minds and hearts of men. It was at this very time that that conception gained such a hold on Hebrew thought; for the Deutero-Isaiah even speaks of Cyrus as Jehovah's Christ. Sin is robbery, defrauding God of His rights, and the only restitution is the sacrifice of a righteous or a sinless offering. But why sacrifice ? Why must the sinless one be slain ? Does God demand this ? My own view is that Hebrew prophecy does not answer yes. God allows it, and conditionally transfers the innocence of the sacrificed to the guilty offerers. God's purpose was that the Servant should preach to the Gentiles and make His name known to the end of the earth; but his countrymen slew Him, and He will only see His spiritual descendants when His soul is made a guilt offering—*i.e.*, when Israel confesses in the words of the foregoing prophecy that He was pierced for *their* transgressions. It seems to me that the teaching of an atonement or reconciliation is here the same as that of the New Testament. The sacrifice is necessary so long as the guilty are unrepentant, so long as there is one person who is willing to scourge an innocent, to turn his face away from human misery and to regard the afflicted as smitten of God—*i.e.*, anyone's charge but his own. To acknowledge that the Servant of Jehovah has borne the penalty of sin and rebellion against God is to admit the value of vicarious sacrifice, not as a welcome means to escape the penalty of one's own sin, but as a logical outcome of sin in the whole human race. And it has this further consequence that all who regard the Servant's death as an *'āshām*, a compensatory guilt-offering, are bound *ipso facto* to take up the work which the Servant resigned and entrusted to them by his voluntary death. There is no compensation where an offence or trespass is continuous. Compensation is only offered *voluntarily*, with a determination to respect the rights of another, so that if the Servant's life is a guilt offering, those who so regard it sin no more against the truth. It would appear that so far as this prophecy is concerned,

God has suffered and accepted an innocent victim to be offered rather than ordained it.

This brings us to the point, Who, then, made his life a guilt offering? As the text stands it would seem to be God, and the meaning would be: If God accepts this offering as compensation for the general sin of His people, the Servant's life will bear fruit in the universal conversion which he had been ordained to secure. But I must confess that the trifling addition of one letter which the LXX read here appeals to me as the more natural thought. The prophet, still addressing his countrymen (it would make no difference if we assumed with the "nationalists" that he addressed the heathen nations) says, "If *ye* will make his life a guilt offering, he will see a seed, he will prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord will prosper in his hand." The consummation of the Righteous and Suffering Servant's work is, as it must inevitably be, conditional upon Israel's acceptance of it. He had been sent to call men to God, and He had died in every outward appearance of failure and disgrace. The appeal still lies as it was first launched. The future power of the message is conditioned by the measure of its acceptance. And the prophet sees the exaltation of the Servant in the distant future.

"He shall see of the travail of his soul, he shall be satisfied when he knoweth it—viz., the result of it. My righteous Servant shall justify many since He bears their iniquities." There are some textual difficulties and some interesting variants in the LXX here and in the next verse. But the general sense is clear. The Servant will perceive that His suffering in obedience to the command of God has borne its fruit, and He will be satisfied when He knows the result. Here, God is the speaker vindicating His chosen one, whose resurrection from the dead is plainly implied.

ALFRED GUILLAUME.

(To be concluded.)

THE MYSTICISM OF ST. AUGUSTINE: CHIEFLY FROM A STUDY OF HIS "CONFESSIONS"*

"WE know good mysticism from bad, as we know good art from bad art. And we are sure that good mysticism, like good art, is somehow of supreme, transcendent importance, but almost always it has remained like a purely symbolic art, not having for others the values which it should have, or did have, for the mystic himself, because not properly enchained, as the French say, 'with stern and immutable fact.'"

So writes Mr. Julian Huxley in his *Essays of a Biologist.* It is surely a gain that the grandson of the illustrious scientist should fasten on the mystical experience as the very heart of religion. If I understand him aright when he speaks of God, he does not mean by God what Christians mean when they use the term; he means by it "an idea organized in a particular way of the whole of the reality with which man is in contact." And, again, he uses the term "mysticism" in its widest and least technical sense. "Mediators there must always be; they are the great ones—the prophets and poets, heroes and philosophers, musicians and artists, and all who discover or interpret or display what for the ordinary man is hidden or difficult or rare. Whatever we may say or like, it is an obvious fact that much of what is essential in religious experience, which in a simpler society was only obtainable in prayer and sacrament, communal ceremony or ritual worship, is now attainable to an increasing degree through literature, music, drama, art—and is gain; so attained by an increasing number of people who do not profess a creed or belong to a church."

This paper attempts to offer some estimate of the mysticism of St. Augustine, not because he is an illustration of all that Mr. Huxley claims for mysticism, but because that side of his life and character, until recently generally ignored, affords not only an interesting subject in itself, but intimately reveals to us his personality and character, as no study of his theological and controversial writings could hope to do.

"St. Augustine is the Prince of Mystics,"† writes Dom Cuthbert Butler, "uniting in himself, in a manner I do not find in any other, the two elements of mystical experience—viz., the most penetrating, intellectual vision into things divine, and a love of God that was a consuming passion. He shines as a sun in the firmament, shedding forth at once light and heat in the lustre of his intellect and the warmth of his religious emotion."

* A paper read at the Taunton Clerical Society.

† *Western Mysticism*, p. 24.

Nor is he the Father of any particular Church in Christendom, nor the founder of any system. His range and influence is universal. With this verdict all who have attempted to estimate his influence, and they are legion even among moderns —Harnack, Newman, Inge, Glover, Butler, Ottley—find agreement. "Others abide our question; thou art free."

For "it is not merely that in intellectual and spiritual endowment he eclipses his contemporaries, but Harnack is uniquely right when he says that between St. Paul and Luther there is none that can be measured with Augustine. He gave to Christian thought on God and man, on sin and grace, on the world and the Church, an impulse and a direction the force of which is still unspent. He shaped the Catholic theory of the Church; he gave the great popes the idea of the City of God, of God's Empire; he was the father of the mystics, the founder of the scholastic philosophy of the Middle Ages, and above all the hero and master of the Renaissance and the Reformation."*

If we wanted briefly to confute the bitter judgment of Mark Pattison, who, after eight years' dreary study of the Fathers, under the spell of Newman's fascination, could only speak of them as the "degenerate and semi-barbarous Christian writers of the fourth century," we could point to the *Confessions*.

That book still speaks to the human heart from the distant unfamiliarity of the fourth century. The empire orientalized by Diocletian seemed for a long time to stand for law, for peace, and for the general order of the universe, and to human imagination secure to the world's end. But its stability was bound up with the personalities of the great emperors, Constantine, Julian, Theodosius; and no personality, however dominant and vivid, could check for long the relentless forces working for its ruin and dismemberment. And yet the dimness of that distracted age was lit up by movements of extraordinary vigour and intellectual freshness, of which Neo-Platonism was the crown and flower. In a world in which all the old landmarks were becoming blurred, the Church had absorbed all that was vital in civilization. She made her mistakes, but she rose superior to the world around her, and to whatever sphere of work and thought we turn—literature, philosophy, administration—we find her marked off from all her environment by one characteristic it had not and she had, life, and the promise of life. That life was nourished not so much by her own inner vitality as by the dangerous assimilation of all that was good in the pagan cultus. The Church had thus won the heathen world. but not converted it. The great mass of the people, in spite

* T. R. Glover, *Life and Letters in the Fourth Century*, chap. ix.

of their confession, remained heathen. In such circumstances it was of supreme value that just when this process of syncretism was in full swing Augustine, equally at home in North Africa, Rome, and Milan, appeared and reminded the Church what Christian faith really was. St. Augustine's *Confessions* is so widely read that the personality of the author is one of the best known in history, and his mysticism can best be studied in that book. There are, of course, many other illustrations of his mysticism scattered throughout his other writings, and these have been collected carefully by Dom Butler in his *Western Mysticism*. We have to bear in mind a certain critical difficulty with regard to the *Confessions*.* The *Confessions* were written twelve years after the date when the record closes, and a certain school of writers have pointed out the great contrast which appears to exist between the dialogues, which were written a few months after Augustine's conversion, and the *Confessions* themselves. I mention this, not to go into the whole critical question, though it is not insoluble, but to draw attention to a scene in Augustine's life which is worth recalling.

After resigning his professorship at Milan, Augustine retired to a country-house which had been lent to him by a wealthy friend, Verecundus. (It should be remembered that at this time Augustine was only a catechumen.) Here the four dialogues were written, the *Contra Academicos*, the *De Beata Vita*, and the *De Ordine*, together with the *Soliloquia*. The account of the way the time was spent which is given in the *Confessions*, where the philosophical debate is contemptuously discussed, is very different from what we find in the dialogues.

There we see Augustine surrounded by his friends, including, besides his mother and Alypius, his son Adeodatus, his brother Navigius, two nephews of Monica, and his pupils Trygetius and Licentius. The gathering was a cheerful one, enlivened by the wit of Licentius, who was the life and soul of the party. They walked together in the park, or talked indoors, accompanied by a shorthand writer, who took notes of their discussions until it became too dark to continue. The debate waged furiously on the philosophical questions of the time, and the whole atmosphere suggests that of a reading party full of exuberance and high spirits, under the friendly control of a genial tutor. The comment in the *Confessions* on this pleasant scene is curious:

"Thanks unto Thee, our God, we are Thine, Thy suggestions and consolations tell us, Faithful in Promises, Thou now requitest Verecundus for his country-house of Cassiciacum, where from the fever of the world we reposed in Thee, with the eternal

* For a full treatment of this difficulty *vide* Gibb and Montgomery, *Confessions*, p. lviii, and the chapter on the Conversion in Montgomery's *St. Augustine*.

freshness of Thy Paradise"; and it cannot be denied that the account is very one-sided, though there are many indications in the dialogues themselves and certain of his letters which clearly show that the two accounts are not totally inconsistent.

"Shall Augustine have made these prayers for Romanianus in vain? Nay, that will not be permitted by Him to whom I have given myself wholly, and whom I have begun in some measure to recognize" (cui totum me dedi).* Here is a clear enough allusion to the *Confessions*.

That marvellous book, "the tenderest scroll that love and recollection ever wrote,"† which has been translated again and again into almost every European language, "and in all loved," which has been a precious possession to thousands of seekers after God, has done more to make people understand and love Augustine than all his elaborate controversial and theological works. Its philosophy is summed up in the two sentences which are familiar to many for whom the rest of Augustine's work is a closed book. "Thou, Lord, hast made us for Thyself, and therefore our hearts are restless until they find rest in Thee";‡ and for the mingling of poignant regret and worship what in literature can compare with the sad cadence of the passage: "Too late have I loved Thee, Thou Beauty so old and yet ever new (sero te amavi); too late I loved Thee. And behold, Thou wast within and I abroad, and abroad I searched for Thee; and yet not really too late," for, as he adds, it had "beamed forth and driven away his blindness, had touched him and set his soul on fire"? §

If by Mysticism we mean "that type of religion which puts the emphasis on immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and immediate consciousness of the Divine Presence," if mysticism is simply religion new-given, the discovery and rediscovery in every age of the truth of the words "I have seen God face to face, and my life is preserved," then, indeed, Augustine is the Prince of Mystics. His Mysticism has been well described by the Dean of St. Paul's as "sane and temperate." Such a phrase is not one of depreciation, it is surely the highest praise. For so much of the writing on this vast subject deals with the abnormal and the eccentric, and seems to leave in the mind of the ordinary reader the unpleasant impression that he has been brought into touch with something which is not so much essentially religious as morbid and pathological. The truth is, we shall never do justice to the great Mystics, nor will their language ever be intelligible at all if we treat this subject

* *Contra Academicos* 11^2.
† See Bright, *Lessons from the Lives of Three Great Fathers*, p. 113.
‡ *Confessions*, i. 1. § *Ibid.*, x. 38.

as a branch of the psychology of religion or their utterances as interesting data for medical enquiry.* The most favourable attitude is to adopt provisionally their own point of view, and to assume that when they tell us that they have had an illumination from above, they are speaking the truth. We should assume the mystical experience as a fact guaranteed by the numerous persons who have testified to it.

And that suggests another important consideration. It is a psychological blunder to imagine that there can be any " pure " experience in which the intellect has no part, for by an inevitable law the human mind works over the remembered experience, selects, rejects, rearranges; and Augustine is no exception to this rule. He interpreted his religious experience largely in terms of Neo-Platonism; and, like nearly all speculative mystics, he adopted the philosophy of Plotinus as the framework of his theology, and when he tried in his *Confessions* to describe what had happened, the description is almost meaningless unless the Platonic background is remembered. This gives to his mysticism a value and dignity which seems to me unique. But not only so, it does not leave the " experience," as Mr. Huxley would say, " not properly enchained with stern and immutable fact," it interprets it in terms of a philosophy upon whose foundations the whole structure of Catholic dogma, apologetic and philosophy is built.

" The Platonic school," writes Dr. Inge, " to which Catholic theology is so much indebted, is certainly not ' intellectualist ' in the disparaging sense. The organ of divine Knowledge (νους) is not the logic-chopping faculty, but the whole personality unified by a discipline which is at least as much moral as intellectual, for the quest of truth, goodness, and beauty. The root-principle of Platonism, as of all Christian Mysticism, is that spiritual things are spiritually discerned, so that the soul must commit itself whole-heartedly to the upward path before it can form any conception of supersensual reality. Certainly the statement that religion is ' irrational ' would seem to Platonists and mystics of all ages nothing less than treason against our highest endowment. The seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are gifts of intellectual enlightenment, and have always been recognized as such by the General Councils which opened with a special invocation of the Holy Spirit. The Catholic theologians never, in theory at least, forgot the truth which they learned from Plotinus, that the mind (or spirit) in love can alone reach the full attainment of divine knowledge. . . . Catholicism is not hospitable to every philosophy. It is, as Troeltsch says, the last creative achievement of classical antiquity, the heir of Greek thought. . . . The whole structure of Catholic dogma, apologetic, and philosophy is built upon the foundations of Greek speculation and Greek mental discipline. It is impossible to tear them asunder; there

* " The influence of the psychological school on the philosophy of religion seems to me to be on the whole mischievous. Psychology treats mental states as the data of a science. . . . The whole method is external; it is a science not of validity, but of origins " (Inge, *Plotinus*, ii. 142).

never was a primitive Church unaffected by Hellenistic ideas. They are apparent in the earliest books of the New Testament. They determined the dogmas and decrees of Christendom. They imposed upon the Church an eschatology which is incompatible with the Jewish beliefs of the first Christians. They introduced into the Church that combination of speculative thought, ascetic discipline, and mystical intuition which belongs essentially to the Platonic tradition. Now this Catholic philosophy, which is a continuation of the 1,000 years of unfettered debate which the Greek race enjoyed before the closing of the schools of Athens, has a quite definite character of its own. It is rationalistic and also mystical, like the philosophy of the Neo-Platonists. A Platonist need not be a Christian, still less a Catholic, but the main presuppositions on which Christian philosophy has always been based are also his."*

One further point, before we come to the passages in the *Confessions* which can specifically be termed "mystical." The proper name for what is now loosely called mysticism is "contemplation." If we adopted the old Latin usage, and discarded the new, we should avoid many misunderstandings of what the mystical quest is. It is simply the aspiration to be brought into touch with the Divine Reality while we are still in the flesh, to open all the avenues by which the inner light, the operation of the Holy Spirit, may illuminate the human soul.

"My mind in the flash of a trembling glance came to Absolute Being—that which is." That is St. Augustine's claim; it has been echoed in different ways down the ages by mystics of every race and of almost every creed.

"Mens mea pervenit ad Id quod est in ictu trepidantis aspectus."

The principal passages for Augustine's mystical theology are these:

Confessions, vii. 10-16, 23; ix. 23-25; x. 12-38, 65, and from these I venture to quote some examples. The first is the description of the manner in which the light at last fully dawned upon him, and is one of the noblest passages in literature.

"And being by these books admonished to return into myself, I entered into the secret closet of my soul, guided by Thee: and this I could do because Thou wast my helper. I entered, and beheld with the mysterious eyes of my soul the light that never changes, above the eye of my soul, above my intelligence. It was not the common light which all flesh can see, nor was it greater yet of the same kind, as if the light of the day were to grow brighter and brighter and flood all space. It was not like this, but something altogether different from any earthly illumination. Nor was it above my intelligence in the same way as oil is above water, or heaven above earth, but it was higher because it made me, and I was

* Dean of St. Paul's, "Catholicism at the Cross Roads," *Quarterly Review*, July, 1923.

lower because made by it. He who knows the Truth knows that Light, and he who knows that Light knows Eternity. Love knows that Light.

"O Eternal Truth, and true Love, and lovely Eternity, Thou art my God; unto Thee do I sigh night and day. When first I knew Thee, Thou didst take hold of me, so that I could see there was something to be seen, though I was not yet fit to see it. And Thou didst beat back my weak sight, dazzling me with Thy splendour, and I thrilled with love and dread, and I perceived that I was far away from Thee in the land of unlikeness, as if I heard Thy voice from on high crying unto me, 'I am the Food of the full-grown; become a man, and thou shalt feed Me. Nor shalt Thou change Me into thine own substance, as thou changest the food of thy flesh, but thou shalt be changed into Mine.' And I understood that Thou dost chasten man for iniquity, and hast made my soul to consume away like a spider's web. And I said, 'Is Truth then nothing, because it is not diffused through space finite or infinite?' And Thou didst cry from afar, 'Nay, not so; I AM THAT I AM.' And I heard as the heart heareth, and there was left no room for doubt. Sooner could I doubt my own existence than think that Truth is not, for it is clearly seen and understood by means of the things which are made" (Book VII., 16).

And part of the famous conversation at the window at Ostia with Monica:

"And as our converse drew to this conclusion, that the sweetest conceivable delight of sense in the brightest conceivable earthly sunshine was not to be compared, no, nor even named, with the happiness of that life, we soared with ardent longing towards the 'Self Same,' we passed from stage to stage through all material things, through heaven itself, whence sun and moon and stars shed their radiance upon earth. . . . And now we began a more inward ascent. . . . And so we came to our own minds, and we passed beyond them, that we might come into the region of unfailing plenty, where Thou feedest Israel with the word of Truth. . . . And as we talked and yearned after it, we touched it—and hardly touched it—with the utmost leap (toto ictu) of our heart. And we sighed, and left there impawned the first fruits of the spirit, and heard again the babble of our tongues, wherein each word had a beginning and ending."

But the whole passage should be studied in its entirety.

Miss E. Underhill* says of this scene, "That is a very beautiful but surely, with its direct dependence upon Plotinus, a very literary scene," and she contrasts another description of Augustine's, after nine years of full and costly Christian life, in which moral and intellectual tensions were completely maintained, "'I tossed upon the waves, and Thou didst steer. . . . What can I say, my God, my Holy Joy? What can any man say when he speaks of Thee?' *That* is not borrowed from books." I confess the distinction seems very artificial. For there is, as she admits, only one test which can be fairly applied to writing such as this. It is simply—does such experience transform those who receive it? Is its authenticity guaranteed

* THEOLOGY, January, 1923.

by its life-giving power? It is a fruitless speculation to ask how Augustine would have expressed himself if he had never heard of Plotinus, and lived on a desert island. We should not have had the *Confessions*, and the whole devotional life of Christendom would have been different. For what did St. Augustine the Mystic achieve?

To Harnack we owe the luminous phrase that Augustine "begat the feeling that Christian piety was grief of soul comforted." The temper of the ancient Christians from the first to the fifth century had been one of hope and fear, of fear because man's faith was insufficient to grasp the Divine forgiveness which was available for sin against God Himself, as well as sins against men. With Augustine the tone was sounded which has been the note of Christian devotion ever since. A limit was attained by him from which the pious mood cannot achieve any further development. All that we mean by Christian piety is due supremely to Augustine; and we think in the terms of Augustinianism. That note is heard constantly in the *Confessions*. "There is only one good, one happiness, one rest. It is a good thing that I should cling to God." All is included there, and the *Confessions* is simply the story of his quest for God, and how he reached peace. For Christian piety, in Harnack's judgment, is simply this: the conviction of sin, the renunciation of our own strength, trust in Divine Grace, and faith in the Personal God Who is apprehended as the Merciful One in the humility of Christ. That is the Augustinian conception of Christianity, and in the Church it is the only legitimate one. It is all latent in the *Confessions*.

His mysticism suggests these further considerations:

1. It is the personal religion of a man of genius who consecrated in service to God a personality endowed with rare and singular gifts. He was a great psychologist,* as well as a thinker, with an amazing power of acute observation, both of external nature and of the processes of the human mind. "Factus eram ipse mihi magna quæstio." He was an artist in his sensitiveness to the beauty of the world,† with a memory for autobiographical detail, and a visualizing power unsurpassed in letters,‡ and with a temperament, warm and emotional, giving him a genius for human friendship. Not only so, but his rhetorical training had made him a master of skilful presenta-

* With regard to his psychology, it is interesting to note Otto's criticism in *The Idea of the Holy*: "Finally, it may be said that we catch a last reflection of the numinous wonder in the wonder, one might almost say in the eager curiosity, with which Augustine roves through the chambers of the soul, even when he is pursuing 'psychological' discussion. He feels that he has a story of marvel to tell when he describes his soul. His psychology is half 'numinology' (*cf. Confessions*, x. 6-27)" (Otto, English translation, p. 200).

† *Confessions*, x. 6. ‡ *Ibid.*, x. 14-16.

tion, and of words, "those chosen and precious vessels of thought," which enabled him to write the autobiography which has been the admiration of Christians in every age, and which is beautifully described in these words of Petrarch:

"Whenever I read your *Confessions*, I am moved by two feelings, by hope and fear (though not without tears at times). I seem to be reading the history of my own wanderings, and not of another."*

Augustine's mysticism is that of the unified personality, sane, temperate, well-balanced; the apprehension of the Divine through will, mind, and feeling. So there is less of vision and of ecstasy, although ecstasy is not entirely wanting,† than in the later Latin mystics; for Augustine's piety, like his genius, rested upon a foundation of plain good sense, which made him reject the abnormal and fantastic. For this reason most modern readers will feel safer in the hands of Augustine, who was not only a great thinker and practical administrator, but a popular preacher, a bishop devoted to his flock, and a voluminous letter-writer, than in those of the mystics of the cloister whose lives were so unlike our own.

2. If it is true, as we have seen, that for Augustine, in a greater degree perhaps than for others, Platonism was the nursing mother of Christianity, yet it must be remembered that the emancipation affected by Platonism was only intellectual and emotional; in the moral sphere it failed him. There are, indeed, many affectionate allusions to his vast debt to the Platonists whose writings delivered him from the absurdity of Manichæism and a materialistic conception of God, but they only revealed to him the "fatherland of peace" from the forest-clad mountain afar, they showed him no way thither.‡ The Divine Word he had found in the Neo-Platonic Intelligence, but the Incarnation and all that it involved he had not found. In Neo-Platonism God had to be reached by man, in St. Paul he had discovered that God was something more than a colourless and indefinable Being, He was a Person whose purpose for man was one of redemptive love.

"I saw a way of gathering strength adequate to enjoy Thee, but I did not find it till I embraced the Mediator between God and man, the Man Christ Jesus."

This experience, spoken of as his conversion, is the heart of

* Gibb and Montgomery, quoted, *Confessions*.

† For a detailed examination of "ecstasy" in Augustine and a comparison with Plotinus, *vide* Inge, *Plotinus*, ii. 125-162; and Butler's *Western Mysticism*, pp. 71-88.

‡ Gibb and Montgomery, *Confessions*, vii. 21. Nemo ibi cantat; nonne deo subdita erit anima mea? ab ipso enim salutare meum; etenim ipse deus meus et salutaris meus, susceptor meus; non mouebor amplius. Nemo ibi audit vocantem; venite ad me, qui laboratis. Dedignantur ab eo discere, quoniam mitis est et humilis corde. Abscondisti enim hæc a sapientibus et prudentibus et revelasti ea parvulis.

Augustine's mysticism, and the recollection of it coloured all his subsequent thinking with regard to sin, free-will, and grace, and made him in his later years the protagonist in the Pelagian controversy. Nor can it be regarded in any way as a mere transient emotion, for the remainder of his life, with its incredible activity and labour, is the direct and lasting result of his mystical experience. His life is indeed an adequate commentary on the validity of the experience. It bore fruit in action.

3. Yet it happens that Augustine, the lonely seeker after God, who in his *Soliloquies* (a dialogue in parts comparable with the *Confessions*) could exclaim, "I desire to know God and the soul—nothing more—nothing at all," cannot be rightly estimated if the emphasis which he laid on external authority be ignored. For though Harnack thinks his exposition of the Church the least of his achievements, even he fully admits that Augustine believed that all great benefits, even communion with God Himself, were attached to historical tradition, and that, while not intending to correct the Church's tradition, he was responsible, as no other, for transforming the authority of the Church into a religious factor. There is no doubt that for Augustine the Church guaranteed the truth of the faith which he had won. And so it always will be. There never has existed a strong religious faith which has not appealed at some decisive point to an external authority. "It is only in the colourless expositions of philosophers or the polemical treatises of Protestant theologians that a faith is constructed which derives its certitude from its own inner impulses."

In a word, Augustine's contribution to later Catholic theory is tersely described in Harnack's phrase: "The Church had henceforth its part in every act of faith, and acts of faith henceforth were acts of obedience." That side of Augustine had to be mentioned to complete the picture, but as this paper is primarily concerned with his mysticism, in its more personal aspect, I would end with a quotation from the Abbot of Pershore, than whom few can be more fitted to speak:

"Man comes to his true self in loving God . . . hence the most fundamental need, duty, honour, and happiness of man, is not petition, nor even contrition, nor again thanksgiving, though these must always have a place in our spiritual life—but Adoration. And it is St. Augustine himself, so intellectual and so anthropomorphic in his devotion, who is above all the Saint of adoring Prayer."*

A. F. JUDD.

* THEOLOGY, April, 1923.

MAGIC AND RELIGION *

THE relation of magic to religion, which has long been a matter of controversy in scientific circles in these latter days, has become a vexed question among theologians, and is even exercising the minds of plain men, whose interest in religion is normally removed from academic disputations. It would seem, therefore, that the time is ripe for a reconsideration of the problem in the light of the most recent scientific evidence in its bearings upon the theological implications.

The close interrelation which exists in primitive society between magic and religion has led some anthropologists to conclude that the magician was the forerunner and prototype of the priest, an age of pure magic having preceded an age of religion. Thus Sir James Frazer imagines that the king is the linear successor through the priest of the medicine-man. On this hypothesis, " when once a special class of sorcerers has been segregated from the community and entrusted by it with the charge of duties on which the public welfare and safety are believed to depend, these men gradually rise to wealth and power till their leaders blossom out into sacred kings. But the great social revolution, which thus begins with democracy and ends in despotism, is attended by intellectual revolution, which affects both the conception and the function of royalty. For as time goes on, the fallacy of magic becomes more and more apparent to the acuter minds, and is slowly displaced by religion; in other words, the magician gives way to the priest, who, renouncing the attempt to control directly the processes of nature for the good of man, seeks to attain the same end indirectly by appealing to the gods to do for him what he no longer fancies he can do for himself. Hence, the king, starting as a magician, tends gradually to exchange the practice of magic for the priestly functions of prayer and sacrifice."†

This theory, that originally man tried to control nature by using what he conceived to be immutable laws till, in process of time, the method proved a failure, and, in consequence, early man came to believe in the existence of divine powers whom he could not control, is simply stated, but it is by no means so easily shown to account for the whole body of primitive rites and beliefs. According to this hypothesis, the Australian aborigines are still in an " age of magic," an assumption which is contradicted by the mere fact that they recognize Supreme Beings, who preside over their sacred ceremonies, and who are such

* An address given at the Midland Institute, Birmingham, on October 8, 1925.
† Frazer, *The Early History of the Kingship* (London, 1905), p. 127.

"High" gods that they have been found by missionaries a convenient means of presenting to the native mind some of the attributes of the Christian conception of the Deity. Moreover, even the medicine-man in Australia is often initiated by the tribal god or by spirits, and therefore his functions are raised from the level of pure magic. If the Australians are in any sense representative of early man, as Frazer supposes, it is clearly not possible to assume stages in the evolution of magic and religion as sharply defined as those exhibited by the geological record of the earth.

Against the position maintained by Frazer, there has been a tendency among other scholars to regard magic and religion as two forms of a social phenomenon originally one and indivisible. Thus Van Gennep treats the "magico-religious" as a complete whole, distinguishing only between the theoretical and the practical aspects of early cult, assigning the term "religion" to the former, and "magic" to the latter.* Dr. Hartland thinks that magic and religion have a common root in a mystic impersonal force called *orenda* or *mana*, but he is inclined to follow Frazer in attributing to the constraining power of sacrifice and prayer a magical significance.† Dr. Marett suggests that in the primitive conception of the supernatural there was a germ both of magic and religion which tended to become differentiated, each going off on lines of its own, religion always remaining the more respectable of the two institutions.‡ The Archbishop of Upsala also thinks that the notion of *mana* represents the earliest stage of the evolution of magic and religion, but the difference between them consists in the use to which they are put. Originally, according to Dr. Söderblom, *mana* was neither good nor bad; but as the concept developed, two species of *mana*, the good and the bad, were differentiated, and then the distinction between magic and religion became clear.§

Since the idea of supernatural power associated with the mysterious and uncanny (*i.e.*, *mana*) has found expression, on the one hand, in the use of charms, amulets, and other magical devices, and called forth, on the other hand, the religious concept of non-moral holiness, described by Dr. Otto as "a primal numinous awe,"‖ magic and religion may be said to have a common origin in an attitude towards the supernatural. Nevertheless, there is a very real difference between the two disci-

* *Les Rites de Passage* (Paris, 1909), p. 18.

† *Ritual and Belief* (London, 1914), p. 66.

‡ *Threshold of Religion* (London, 1914), p. 36 *ff.* *Cf.* article "Magic," Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. viii.

§ *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens* (Leipzig, 1916), German trans. by R. Stübe, pp. 195, 202 *f.*

‖ *The Idea of the Holy* (Oxford, 1923), p. 7 *ff.*

plines as fundamental as that between the conception of a *house* and a *home*. Both may be composed of the same materials and present a similar appearance, but the psychological distinction is such that they cannot be said to be "genetically akin." Dr. Söderblom recognizes that there is a difference of aim between magic and religion, but he attributes this to two feelings towards *mana*—fear and trust—instead of assigning it to the purpose of the rites. Surely the real distinction lies in the fact that though the *modus operandi* may be the same in the two cases, the ends to which they are applied are totally different. Magic emerged for purely practical reasons—to exploit the sacred from within, frequently for private and personal gain—whereas religion represents man's attitude to the supernatural conceived of as external and superior to himself, and therefore able to help him. The magician compels, while the priest supplicates the superhuman powers, and merely acts on their behalf and as their agent. The psychological approach, therefore, constitutes an essential difference—the distinction between act and agent.

While magic never was religion nor was religion ever magic, the two have existed side by side both in ancient and modern times. Thus in Egypt in the eighteenth dynasty, while the belief prevailed in one eternal, almighty, invisible god behind the sun, who created the heavens and the earth; and in the resurrection of the mummified human body in an immortal and glorified form in the everlasting kingdom of Osiris, who, though of divine origin, had lived on the earth and suffered at the hands of his enemies and risen from the dead—even side by side with these lofty religious notions, belief in the power of amulets and talismen and in magical names and words of power was retained. But while magic and religion frequently occur together, psychologically they represent such entirely different attitudes of mind that before a rite or practice can be described as magical it is necessary to examine the intention with which it is performed. Broadly speaking, however, amulets, charms, and spells may be said to belong to magic, and sacraments, worship, and prayer to religion.

In all ages the sense of wonder in the presence of the awful —the emotion which Otto calls *mysterium tremendum*—is the most fundamental element in religious experience. As he rightly says, "All ostensible explanations of the origin of religion in terms of animism or magic or folk psychology are doomed from the outset to wander astray and miss the real goal of their inquiry unless they recognize this fact of our nature—primary, unique, underivable from anything else—to be the basic factor and the basic impulse underlying the entire process of religious

evolution."* It is this essentially religious impulse which lies behind the idea of "sacredness," tabu, and worship, producing that attitude of mind which finds expression in the cry, "How dreadful is this place!" Here, too, we have the emotion which represents the beginning of the notion, however vague it may have been at first, of a "transcendent Something, a real operative entity of a numinous kind, which later, as the development proceeds, assumes concrete form as a 'numen loci,' a dæmon, an El, a Baal, or the like."† Thus the concept of the awful passes into that of the "numen," a divine power associated with a particular object or place. "This is none other than the house of God (Elohim)."

In Catholicism this concept finds expression in the Eucharist, where is perpetuated, as Catholics believe, "the entry of the Divine in fullest and loftiest presence upon the human scene." As they kneel before the Holy Sacrament on the altar or in the tabernacle, rightly or wrongly, they believe that God is in the midst, experienced as "numen præsens."

> "Thee we adore, O hidden Saviour, Thee
> Who in Thy Sacrament art pleased to be;
> Both Flesh and Spirit in Thy Presence fail,
> Yet here Thy Presence we devoutly hail.
>
> "O Christ, Whom now beneath a veil we see,
> May what we thirst for soon our portion be:
> To gaze on Thee unveiled, and see Thy Face,
> The Vision of Thy glory and Thy grace."

Thus they are stirred to a genuinely religious experience as far removed from magic, in the scientific sense of the term, as is a Quaker meeting from an Australian Intichiuma ceremony. The chapel of the Blessed Sacrament to the Catholic is an "awful place," because for him it is none other than the house of God, where, though as yet he sees through a glass darkly, he catches a glimpse of the Beatific Vision. Therefore, so far as the worshipper is concerned, his attitude towards the doctrine of the Real Presence is strictly religious. But what about the actual doctrine itself? Is it a product of magic or religion?

The Church claims to do what Christ did at the institution of the Eucharist. According to the Catholic interpretation of the rite, the elements, by virtue of the act of consecration by a duly appointed minister, take over a new and spiritual value, so that, metaphysically, they are really, by Divine appointment, the Body and Blood of Christ. By this change of properties, to quote Mr. Selwyn, "the Word is not made incarnate in the Blessed Sacrament; rather His incarnate Life is made *insignate* —that is, embodied in an effectual sign—and in that mode

* *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 15. † *Op. cit.*, p. 130.

becomes the object of our adoration."* The spiritual reality may be conveyed by a symbol or sign, but, as Dr. Temple says, "the symbol is emphatically not mere symbol; it is an instrument of the Lord's purpose to give Himself to us, as well as the symbol of what He gives. . . . Through the consecrated elements we find Christ specially apprehensible, so that He is not personally localized; He is accessible by means of what is local. The elements come by the act of consecration to be the vehicle to us of His Human Nature and Life. That is now their value, and therefore their true 'substance.'"†

There is nothing in this conception that, in the scientific sense, can be interpreted as of magical significance, and it is difficult to understand how anyone abreast of modern thought can speak of "inanimate matter taking over spiritual properties" as a magical process. The tendency now is to assume that behind all physical and mental phenomena there is a metaphysical essence, conscious or unconscious, so that the material is regarded as less and less material. Behind the atom and its electrons there is an "energy" upon which all phenomena depend. Matter is but one receptacle or vehicle of this energy, and if we substitute the term "spirit" for "energy," we arrive at the conclusion, which would not be denied by a competent physicist, that behind the material universe there is a primary entity of a spiritual character which constitutes matter. It is this entity that corresponds in some measure to the medieval "substantia," and to the modern philosophical notion of "value." Thus Dr. Temple maintains that "the only entity in any object distinguishable from the sum total of the 'accidents' is, I submit, its value."‡ Therefore he explains the doctrine of the Real Presence as "transvaluation"—a term that preserves the reality of Christ's Eucharistic Presence in the consecrated elements without confusing it with the material concept of "substance" (as we use the word to-day), as in the expressions "transubstantiation" and "consubstantiation." It also avoids Bishop Gore's theory of conditional consecration, and the distinction between the essential manhood and material constituents of Christ's human Body.§ By the act of consecration it is not the crucified Christ Who is "reanimated," not even the glorified Saviour Who comes to our altars (for this might involve the sixteenth-century idea of a "local presence in heaven," whereas heaven is no longer regarded as a place, or the Body of Christ as subject to conditions of space||), but Christ in

* E. G. Selwyn, *The First Book of the Irenicum of John Forbes* (Cambridge, 1923), p. 242. † W. Temple, *Christus Veritas* (London, 1924), p. 239 *f.*

‡ *Op. cit.*, p. 247.

§ *Body of Christ* (London, 1901), pp. 61 *ff.*, 98, 126, 131 *ff.*

|| Herein lies the error of the crude notion of "the prisoner of the Tabernacle."

His whole and essential Being, crucified, risen, ascended, glorified. "This is My Body." By a transvaluation of values "inanimate matter," in response to the Will of its Creator, becomes the vehicle and medium whereby the Incarnation and all that it entailed is perpetuated "insignate." The Eucharistic Host is really and truly His Body, the effective symbol of His Personality, the veil of His Presence, and the channel of His Grace, for "value is the element in real things which both causes them to be, and makes them what they are."*

That this is brought about by a specific act of consecration on the part of a human agent does not in any way detract from the religious character of the doctrine and its allied practices. The function of the priest, of course, is purely representative, depending upon the commission he has received from above, not upon his own inherent *mana*. "Receive ye the Holy Ghost for the office and work of a priest in the Church of God, now committed unto thee by the imposition of our hands." While the precise significance of the institution of a ministry by our Lord is a vexed question among theologians, Catholics have always maintained that a special ministerial commission was given to the Apostles to hand on in perpetuity to succeeding generations,† and therefore for them the priest is in a peculiar sense the agent of Christ. Thus he is not a medicine-man practising his science through his inherent magical powers, but the earthly representative of the supreme and perfect *Sacerdos* eternally in the heavens; and in His name and on His behalf he performs His ordinances in accordance with His Will and Commandments. The commission to minister in the things of God can only be given by God; the Bishop, by his sacramental act of laying on of hands, merely exercises his function for Christ and for the priestly body of which Christ is Head. Ordination is therefore a special gift of the Holy Spirit for the purpose of setting apart living agents to represent Christ and His Body, the Church. A priest consecrates the Eucharist by virtue of this commission in the name of Christ and of the whole Church. Thus the rite is thoroughly "religious" from the anthropological standpoint, being beneficent, public (*i.e.*, performed on behalf of the community), and controlled by a personal God regarded as external and superior to man. Thus while grace is conferred as a result of the sacramental action—*ex opere operato*—it depends wholly and entirely on the

* Temple, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

† The earlier and more satisfactory theory of the Apostolic Succession places the emphasis on the Bishop as the representative of the flock duly accredited and installed in the chair of his predecessor, rather than on a mechanical sacramental transmission by laying on of hands. *Cf.* C. H. Turner in *Early History of the Church and Ministry*, ed. by H. B. Swete (London, 1921), p. 95 *ff.*

Will of God, and not on the repetition of a formula or the mere performance of a correct rite.

Moreover, unlike amulets, spells, totemic sacramental meals, and the ritual eating of the first fruits, the Christian sacraments depend for their spiritual efficacy on the moral dispositions and co-operation of the recipients. Among uneducated and uninstructed people Baptism is used not infrequently more or less as a charm, but only because they are ignorant of the true significance of the rite. Likewise, doubtless among both Catholics and Protestants, Communions are sometimes made without the proper dispositions, but, especially in the case of Catholics, this is done only in spite of insistent teaching to the contrary, and the provision of a sacramental ordinance whereby the communicant may approach the altar in a state of grace.

Every human activity is liable to abuse, and man's attitude towards the supernatural is no exception to the rule. As Dr. Bicknell says, "Even among ourselves to-day prayer easily degenerates into spell when we suppose that the correct repetition of the right formula of prayer or the due performance of some religious act will automatically produce some result. When Christianity has been weakened by superstition, Masses, for instance, have been supposed, as it were, to put a certain compulsion on God. And, more generally, as soon as we allow ourselves to forget our moral relationship to a God of righteousness, and turn to vain repetitions or mere outward forms which have no spiritual effort behind them, religion tends to slip back into magic and prayer into spell. God becomes simply a power whom we exploit for our own ends."*

This is illustrated in the case of the reverence and veneration originally paid to the mortal remains of the martyrs and saints because, as the Council of Trent maintains, their bodies were the temples of the Holy Ghost, and members of Christ, and will be raised to eternal life, developing into a cult of relics often indistinguishable in actual practice from a magical conception of *mana* inherent in a sacred object. Officially it may be held that the benefits bestowed upon man through them are from God,† and it cannot be denied, in face of the doctrine of the Incarnation, that matter in any form may be a vehicle of grace. But once the sign is dissociated from the thing signified, and given supernatural properties of its own independently, religion tends to become magic. To pray (and possibly to erect a candle as a symbol of the prayer) before an image or a relic is a definitely religious act, provided, of course, that the petition is made to God; and the veneration of sacred objects, honoured merely

* E. J. Bicknell, *In Defence of Christian Prayer* (London, 1925), p. 5 *f.*

† *Cf.* Duchesne, *Fastes épiscopaux de l'ancienne Gaule* (Paris, 1894-1900), i., p. 40

because of their relation to Christ and His saints, whose memorials they are, undoubtedly belongs to the domain of religion. But when the image or icon is given a sacramental value, it being supposed that through and by it God works miracles, there is a tendency to assign a distinct and separate personality to the object, which is capable of being exploited for private ends, certain pictures or statues being especially efficacious for particular graces or healing properties.* The image, like the portrait statue among the ancient Egyptians, is regarded as the dead man himself, and accredited with inherent powers which can only be called magical. Thus it cures the sick by contact, stops fire and flood when set in its path, and can be coerced into granting the wishes of its devotees by chastisement.

How far removed are these attempts to exploit the supernatural from the attitude of a devout and instructed Catholic towards the Blessed Sacrament is obvious. The doctrine of the Real Presence is quite clearly inseparably bound up with the outward and visible sign, since it is the elements that become the channel of grace and the focus for devotion. The Holy Sacrament to the worshipper is the indication of the Divine Presence to which it is justifiable, at least on his hypothesis, that *religious* worship should be directed. Therefore, to describe Mass and Communion and prayers said privately or corporately before the Reserved Sacrament as magic is as unscientific as it is uncharitable and untrue. It is only when the sign is dissociated from the Divine Presence signified that the Real Presence is in danger of losing its essentially religious value for the worshippers, as, for example, in the medieval abuses connected with the elevation of the Host.

It is, therefore, reasonable to urge that "all devotions in connection with the Blessed Sacrament shall be within the horizons of the Eucharistic action; that they are not something superadded to that, as a development of it, but are a part of it removed for the time being from their proper context and presented in a different order."† If the English Episcopate in their deliberations at this time would bear these weighty words in mind, and act in accordance with them, they would not only be able to find a solution to the "present distress," but they would also render a really valuable service to Catholic faith and practice by showing the right attitude to be preserved towards the doctrine of the Real Presence. They might well forbid any handling of the elements, since this is to introduce another symbolism of action, but they should not only allow,

* F. Marin, *Les moines de Constantinople* (Paris, 1897), p. 318 *ff.*

† *First Book of the Irenicum of John Forbes*, p. 246 *f.*

but encourage, the use of the Tabernacle as the place of Reservation, seeing that the altar is the centre of Eucharistic association. To hide the Blessed Sacrament away in a remote corner of the church or in a Sacrament House tends to dissociate it from its proper setting, and to cause it to be regarded as an independent entity. To regulate extra-liturgical uses along these lines would command the ready and whole-hearted support of all thoughtful and well-informed Anglo-Catholics, and at the same time safeguard the doctrine of the Real Presence from medieval abuses. The Church of England hitherto has permitted, and in fact encouraged, flexibility and experiment in all directions, and it would be contrary to the Englishman's love of fair play to refuse devotional liberty to one section of opinion, while at the same time allowing the utmost freedom of expression to another school of thought.

It is now perfectly clear that in matters of faith and practice we have all moved very far from the "Reformation Settlement," as the utterances of Modernists alone are sufficient to testify, and surely what is required at this juncture is an ordered liberty based on an intelligent understanding of the real points at issue. Certainly nothing will be gained by deliberately refusing to see the point of view of those with whom we disagree, or by the persistent abuse of their most sacred beliefs. This method of approach to manifestly difficult problems is as unscientific as it is un-Christian, and it is only calculated to produce a deadlock, with disastrous results to the best interests of religion. The first step in the scientific study of any problem is exhaustiveness of observation and strict impartiality. When the question of magic and religion in their relation to the Catholic doctrine of the Sacraments is investigated scientifically, it becomes evident that the belief in the Real Presence belongs exclusively to the domain of religion, and so long as the Blessed Sacrament is regarded as "the entry of the Divine in fullest and loftiest presence upon the human scene," it constitutes for Catholics the numinous event *par excellence* in their religious experience, the zenith of worship and prayer. Therefore scientific truth and Christian courtesy alike demand that the charge of magic and superstition be withdrawn from those who in good faith, as they kneel before the sacramental Presence, are stirred to a genuinely religious impulse which finds expression in the cry, "How dreadful is this place! This is none other than the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven."

E. O. James.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Miss M. L. Kirkpatrick, Newspaper Secretary of S.P.G. (15, Tufton Street, S.W.1), writes that she has a number of missionary workers overseas asking for Theology, and would be glad to give names and addresses to any of our readers who would be willing to post on their copies, if they will communicate with her. Copies should not be sent to the office, but direct to the addresses which she will give. May we again endorse this appeal, which has had excellent results on earlier occasions?

The series of lectures by Dr. Goudge, Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford, published in the October, November, and December numbers of Theology under the title of *What is the Gospel?* will shortly be issued in book form, with the addition of a concluding lecture not hitherto printed.

Among contributors to the present issue the Rev. A. F. Judd is Vicar of Wilton, Taunton; and the Rev. E. O. James, D.Litt., Vicar of St. Thomas's, Oxford, is well known as a first-hand student of anthropology. He published *Primitive Ritual and Belief* in 1917, and *An Introduction to Anthropology* in 1919; and both books are frequently alluded to by fellow-workers in that field of knowledge.

As we go to press the December *Expositor* reaches us, with the announcement that it is the last monthly issue that will appear. To many besides ourselves the *Expositor* has been an old and valued friend, and its disappearance will bring a sense of personal regret. Happily, however, the editor is able to temper this at once with consolation; for he promises for next spring the first issue of *The Expositor's Year Book*, containing "a survey of the best work done during the previous year—*i.e.*, theological work, primarily connected with the Bible." Dr. Moffatt's own reputation, combined with the fact that he has secured the co-operation of such scholars as Dr. T. H. Robinson and Dr. Box, should assure us of a valuable contribution to theological learning.

In the article by Mr. R. E. Gordon George entitled "Church and State in Italy," which we published last September, the following sentence occurred:—

"'Il nous suffisait,' wrote Cardinal Mercier in a passage which was omitted by a certain Roman Catholic journal which reproduced the rest of his pastoral, 'de savoir que nous marchions d'accord avec l'autorité suprême, bénis et encouragés par elle.'"

Strong exception to this passage was taken in *The Tablet* of September 26, on the ground that it had been interpreted as referring to that paper, and we were asked to clear matters up by printing the name of the Roman Catholic journal alluded to in Mr. George's article. We have been in correspondence with Mr. George and learn from him that he took the whole passage, including the note about its suppression, from a French Roman Catholic paper, entitled *L'Année Catholique*, and that he did not and does not know to what "journal" it was referring. We know anyhow now that it was not *The Tablet*.

CORRESPONDENCE

MR. J. S. FLETCHER ON THE REFORMATION IN NORTHERN ENGLAND

I AM very grateful to Mr. Fletcher for putting his view so clearly, and to the editor for publishing it. He thinks that the Reformation was wholly unpopular and largely heretical, that the laity who supported it did so entirely from political or mercenary reasons, and that the clergy who accepted it were simply greedy or terrorized time-servers. I do not think that opinion is historically true. I do not think such wholesale accusations can be justified. I have given two examples. Bishop Tunstall accepted the Reformation under Henry VIII., and repudiated the papal supremacy. He officiated at Edward VI.'s coronation, and retained his bishopric, actively performing his duties till May, 1551. It is, of course, quite true that he changed his mind later and would not accept the supremacy which Elizabeth asserted less strongly than her father. He had accepted the Henrician settlement: I never said that he accepted the Elizabethan. The importance of Bernard Gilpin is that he retained a benefice under Mary and under Elizabeth, and was a model parish priest, certainly not greedy or time-serving. My opinion differs from that of Mr. Fletcher on these points: (1) There seems to me to be no question at all that the vast majority of the English people accepted the Reformation settlement without dispute, willingly, naturally, and happily. I do not think the laity did so from political or mercenary reasons. As Burke says, I do not know how to draw an indictment against a whole people. And an enormous majority of the clergy also accepted the supremacy of the Crown "over all persons, in all causes"; trained many of them, born nearly all of them, before the important Reformation changes, ministering many of them under Edward VI., nearly all of them under Mary, and continuing to minister under Elizabeth. The colleges of Oxford show typical examples of persons of education, founders of learned and religious foundations, who remained members of the English Church, and accepted her ministrations under Mary and Elizabeth alike, notably the founders of St. John's and Wadham. The vast majority of English people went on saying their prayers, going to public worship, reciting the creeds, as the national Church taught them.

I do not think anyone who knew Bishop W. E. Collins, one of the most learned, conscientious, and saintly of men, would think him capable of unfair, *ex parte*, unreliable, and specious statements, and I am surprised that anyone who has read his paper on the Northern Rebellion should do so. And there is no question that those who had joined that Rebellion and were executed afterwards were executed because they had done so.

W. H. HUTTON.

SOME RECENT BOOKS

PHILOSOPHICAL

MIRACLE AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS. By F. R. Tennant. Cambridge University Press. 1925. 4s. 6d. net.

This admirable little book is a funeral oration over the *quondam* scientific dogma that miracles are *à priori* impossible; but Dr. Tennant insists that the theological belief in the evidential value of miracle must be buried in the same grave. So far as that is concerned, one may wonder whether the funeral is not rather belated; though indeed we would not miss a line of Dr. Tennant's lucid and passionless pages. For, if they close one chapter in the history of the concept of miracle, they open others; and these have a long vogue yet. Let us consider one or two of these.

The country parson often wonders whether he shall use the prayer for Rain and its analogous prayers and thanksgivings or not. Dr. Tennant says that such prayer, though it may be open to ethical objections, " is not to be ruled absurd on specifically *scientific* grounds " (p. 58); and he goes on to say why. If we acknowledge that man by his will can interfere with the course of nature, we cannot deny that such modification of nature's tendencies may be caused on an even vaster scale by the action of God on and through human minds. " We can understand mediate, in addition to immediate, divine action upon the world; for human alteration of Nature's course is common fact." The question inevitably suggests itself whether in fact *all* miracles are not the result of the *rapport* between human minds and the divine—an overflow of grace, as it were, from the spirit of the man or woman of faith into the physical environment with which it is united. There would be no difficulty in including here the miracles of our Lord's ministry, nor in fact His Birth of a Virgin and Resurrection. In the case of the former, indeed, fresh meaning would be given to St. Luke's narrative of the Annunciation with its emphasis on the " power of the Highest " overshadowing Mary—surely an allusion to her soul's mystical union with the Spirit of God. And we should have further cause for hesitating to distinguish between the biblical and the ecclesiastical miracles. The wonderful scene in *Saint Joan*, where the wind suddenly changes by the river bank, is no more marvellous than an answer to a prayer for rain.

Such a view of miracle as mediated through incarnate human personality will perhaps suggest a modification of Dr. Tennant's claim that, granted the possibility of miracle, we can never know of any given event that it is one. We can discern, he says, its discontinuity with the normal sequences of things in the scientific sense, and that is one-half of the criterion of miracle; but the other half—divine causation—is necessarily beyond our ken. If the *miraculum* is a direct interposition of the divine will, this is true. But if it represents a divine operation mediated through, and in relation to, the faith of a human personality, our agnosticism is not so complete. We can and do say, of this person or that, that God has touched their hearts, or that His Spirit is with them. In relation to character, that is to say, we are able to discern the divine agency. And a miracle will thus be an event which on its physical side is " dis-

continuous" or abnormal, and is at the same time manifestly in relation to a human personality which is religiously significant. That may not give us a clear line of demarcation between the *mirabile* and the *miraculum;* nor does it rescue the "evidential value" of miracle; but it does give us an intellectual basis and space for that common-sense attitude towards miracle which we find in the Bible and the Creeds, and which on the whole is the one element of truth in the riotous record of miracle provided by hagiography.

THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND ITS COMPETITORS TO-DAY. By A. C. Bouquet, D.D. Being the Hulsean Lectures for 1924-5. Cambridge University Press. 6s. net.

The four competitors are Secularism, Pantheism, Traditionalism, and Relativism, and they are competing presumably for the allegiance of mankind. But is there really any chance that man will ever give his allegiance to an -ism? He may give it to a Person, or even to an institution such as the Church; but never surely to one of those abstractions which end in -ism. In the last essay, Dr. Bouquet gets away to some extent from this entanglement, and comes down to the concrete problem discussed by Troeltsch as to the sense, if any, in which Christianity can claim to be the final religion, and here he is at his best. In the earlier lectures he is inevitably handicapped by having to desiccate systems of thought of all their warm flesh and blood in order to pack them into the available space.

It is almost impossible under such circumstances to be fair. When Dr. Bouquet writes of Latin Christianity that "it is frankly an experiment at creating a world religion by grafting what is admitted on all hands to be the purest spiritual religion which has ever appeared on this planet on to previously existing religious systems in order to disturb them as little as possible," he seems to forget that that is precisely what our Lord and His Apostles had to do *vis-à-vis* Judaism, and what Alec Fraser set himself to do at Trinity College, Kandy. The problem is not *whether* this "grafting" shall be done, but *on what principles;* and if Dr. Bouquet had addressed himself seriously to that problem, as, for example, Moehler did in his *Symbolik*, he might have made us all the wiser. As it is, the chapter on "Traditionalism" is little more than a piece of very prejudiced writing.

Generalizations are, no doubt, inevitable when subjects so vast have to be treated on such a scale. But, again, they should be cautious. Had Dr. Bouquet read G. P. Gooch's recent work *Germany*, for instance, with its record of how the Catholic Church is making a greater success than anyone else of the new "Youth movement" in that country, he would hardly have written what he has on p. 94 as to "the shrinkage of the traditionalist Churches all over the world" or as to the reason for it. Nor does he offer us any appealing alternative. "The main types of organized Christianity," he says (p. 135), "depend too largely upon a compromise with the lower forms of pre-Christian religion to be able to withstand the attacks of science, and their God is still much more Zeus Pantocrator than the trustworthy and philocosmic but self-limited parent of the Gospel teaching." One hardly knows whether Dr. Bouquet would have us recognize in these last ponderous words our Lord's revelation of the Father. As he puts the contrast, there does not seem much to choose between its two terms.

DOCTRINAL

LESSONS ON THE WAY. Vol. III. The Resurrection, the Spirit, and the Church. By Percy Dearmer, D.D. Heffers. 4s. net.

This admirable series of Dr. Dearmer's should be in the hands of all clergy and superintendents of Sunday Schools and Catechisms; and it will be useful in the Day School too. The volume before us is emphatically a teacher's book, and does not provide the wealth of detail as to method which is fashionable nowadays in lesson-books of this type. But it is a questionable fashion, as it tends to distract the mind from a good deal that needs to be thought, even if not said, on the substance of the lesson. Two of the most valuable features of Dr. Dearmer's work are (1) the steady inculcation and explanation of the distinction between the literal and the metaphorical—a distinction which is vital to any intelligent teaching of the Bible and the Creed; and (2) the wealth of apt and graceful illustration.

School and Sunday School will not exhaust the value of these books. Parents of the educated classes are frequently asking for books which will help them to teach their children the Faith. They should find in Dr. Dearmer's series just what they want, and not less so because now and then they will feel tempted to disagree.

LITERARY

THE LIFE OF JAMES ELROY FLECKER. By Geraldine Hodgson, Litt.D. Basil Blackwell. 1925. 12s. 6d. net.

Among modern poets an honoured place is taken by the late James Elroy Flecker, whose Life has been written by Dr. Geraldine Hodgson. Brought up in a deeply religious Evangelical home, which was at the same time full of intellectual stimulus, Flecker went to Uppingham at the age of sixteen; and there I well remember seeing him from time to time, conspicuous among his fellows with his dark hair and sensitive, spiritual face. His comments on his Uppingham period recall many an incident which those who knew the school in those days will recollect; though it should perhaps be said that Flecker was appreciated far more warmly than evidently he realized at the time by those in authority; and it is not difficult to trace in the pupil a good deal of the vigorous educational influence of his headmaster. After Uppingham, Trinity College, Oxford, where he "hated philosophy"; two years of waiting, mostly earning a living as a schoolmaster; and two years at Caius College, Cambridge, preparing for entrance to the Consular Service. It is surprising that he derived so little inspiration from the University which has been *par excellence* the home of poets; and it was only when he reached the East that his gifts began to come to their maturest blossom. That was in June, 1910; and into the four years and a half which elapsed between then and his death in Switzerland were crowded all the works which have placed him among the immortals.

Dr. Hodgson compares Flecker's work with that of the French Symbolists such as Samain. My own instinct would be to compare him with that exquisite and passionate singer Péguy. Their experience of life differed widely; but in both there was the same intuition of spiritual beauty and the conviction that it was the true and the real. Both were

great colorists; and, though Flecker did not, like Péguy, drink in the love of colour from the religious tradition of his upbringing and schooling, he was able to fill the gap from what he saw in Constantinople and Syria. It was indeed a happy thought which took one of his own lines as his epitaph:

> And thou shalt see the gleaming worlds as men see dew upon the grass.

THE SIRENS. An Ode. By Laurence Binyon. Macmillan. 5s. net.

Mr. Laurence Binyon's Ode entitled *The Sirens* is a proof that English poets can still produce work of fine and new quality. The subject of the poem is the spirit of adventure which never leaves man content. After a short and very musical Prelude, the first section entitled "The Victories" tells how conquerors, mariners, mountain-climbers, men of science have found themselves unable to rest in their several achievements; and here is contained a passage which might well form the epitaph of Mallory and Irvine on Everest:

> Careless of death is he, riding in the eagle's ways
> Above the peak and storm, so dear a sting
> Drives him unresting to strive beyond the boundaries
> Of his condition, being so brief a thing,
> Being a creature perishable and passionate,
> To drink the bright wine, danger, and to woo
> Life on the invisible edge of precipices,
> A lover, else to his own faith untrue,
> Giving the glory of youth for flower of sacrifice
> Upon the untried way that he must tread,
> So that he savour the breath of life to the uppermost,
> Breath only sweet when all is hazarded.

The second section is called "Penumbra," and describes man's restless disappointment with industry and invention, the pleasures of sense, religion—even love itself, until (and here Mr. Binyon shows himself a good Meredithian) the child is born. But it is religion as organized, conventionalized, caged, which disappoints—not that religion of experience wherein man knows himself a citizen of heaven. In the last section, called "The Undiscovered World," our poet speaks of this and voices the profound and passionate penitence that belongs to it:

> But of the eternal vision to partake,
> And see what we have done, and what refused,
> To what accepted blindness we grow used,
> And what marred shapes of one another make,
> This is to weep such tears as no flesh-throes have cost.
> Weep for our loves, our loves, that we ourselves have slain,
> The powers of loveliness that we have left forlorn.
> Eyes we had and saw not, ears and we did not hear!
> Ah, when the heart, full visioned, breaks in shame and pain,
> Then is the world's hope born.

The Romans used to call a poet *vates*, which meant both singer and seer; and to both titles Mr. Binyon has a high claim.

AN ANTHOLOGY OF MEDIÆVAL LATIN. Chosen by Stephen Gaselee. Macmillan. 1925. 7s. 6d. net.

These forty-five selections are a delight to any who enjoy the infinite versatility of the Latin tongue. Poems, hymns, stories, letters, visitation documents, expositions of Scripture, most of them recalling names or scenes well-known in history, give to this book a rare distinction. Here

are extracts from chroniclers such as Asser and Luitprand: here is Henry VI.'s hymn still sung at Prayers in College at Eton,

Rex Henricus, sis amicus
Nobis in angustia, etc.:

and here, as though born out of due time, Lord Dufferin's speech at a banquet in Ireland in 1856, a veritable *tour de force*. It is in praise of wine and women. The whole should be quoted, but we must be content with the last section:

Bibamus salutem earum, et confusionem ad omnes bacularios: speramus quod eae caræ et benedictæ creaturæ invenient tot maritos quot velint,—quod geminos quotannis habeant, et quod earum filiæ, maternum exemplum sequentes, gentem Islandicam perpetuent in sæcula sæculorum.

ECCLESIASTICAL

The Nation and the Church. Six Charges by Bertram Pollock, Bishop of Norwich. John Murray. 1925. 5s. net.

The Changing Order. By Kenneth Ingram. Philip Allan and Co. 1925. 5s. net.

Anglo-Catholicism at the Cross-Roads. By Rev. C. Beaufort Moss. Faith Press. 1925. 1s.

The writer a century hence who desired to form some estimate of the comprehensiveness of the Church of England in the year 1925 might do worse than summon these three books, written respectively by a bishop, a layman, and a priest, as his evidence; for it is difficult to imagine three points of view more distinct and (as between two of them) more at variance. We will take these two first. Mr. Ingram and Mr. Moss represent the two main tendencies now at work in Anglo-Catholicism; the one turning to the Roman Church, and the other to the Orthodox East for its closest allies outside our own Communion; and each claiming to have a rightful place in the English Church. Their point of divergence is, not unnaturally, the question of authority.

The Changing Order is charmingly written, and purports to record a series of conversations in which a London priest of the "advanced" school tries to persuade a country squire that the innovations which his Vicar was introducing into the village church were not pure eccentricities, but had a principle behind them. The principle was broadly this: that the Prayer Book provides only a skeleton outline of the devotional life of the English Church, and that it needs to be interpreted and filled in by reference to the developing life of the whole Catholic Church. We are both Western and modern; and our standard of authority, therefore, is to be found in the contemporary life of the Western Church, in the sense that all Roman developments since the Reformation which are not or have not been actually repudiated by the Eastern Church may be legitimately believed and taught and practised in the Church of England. If an audacious claim could be vindicated by the suavity with which it is pleaded, Mr. Ingram would have his case. But, of course, it cannot be so. Rather we should say that a good case—for we suspect that Stanson had quite a good case—has been ruined by the theory put forward in its defence. What can perfectly rightly be urged is that Anglican authority cannot, without stultifying both its intelligence and its charity, afford to ignore religious developments in the Church of Rome: our appeal backwards to Scripture and the Fathers needs to be accompanied by a

lateral reference to what is going on in the Church of the Continent, both east and west. But a reference is very different from an appeal. Mr. Ingram appears to think that any group of Anglicans is entitled to decide what falls within the formula he has invented and what does not; he ignores, for instance, the well-known fact that the extra-liturgical services which he defends are quite definitely repudiated by the East; and he appears unaware that there is, and has been since the Reformation, a very vital tradition of Anglo-Catholic theology which is emphatically neither Eastern nor Latin. We are not, in fact, Western, but North-Westerns; and the Nordic element is as important as any.

Mr. Moss's book represents in short compass the more classical tradition of Anglo-Catholicism; but, because no one nowadays is altogether content with his own part of God's vineyard, he is for claiming affinity with the Eastern Church and would have us style ourselves "Western Orthodox." The real difficulty about Mr. Moss's position is that it is not obviously a road. It is more like a canal, flowing between the fixed banks of Anglican formularies. Its direction is plain and straightforward enough; but we miss a good deal of the richness of the surrounding country by this route, and it needs some adapting to the up-and-down configuration of that territory of the human soul through which the religion of Christ has to make its way. But our hope is that when the Bishops have finished their revision of the Prayer Book, we shall see that they have given us a real road, and one that goes (as Mr. Moss's canal does) in one clear direction—the direction of the heavenly Zion.

Meanwhe the pract cal work of the Church goes on, and the Bishop of Norwich's Charges deal with some of its problems. "Church organization," he says, "has no value except in so far as it leads to the glory of God, to a greater spirit of adoration and righteousness, and to a larger service of God and man"; and it would be difficult to conceive of a finer spirit in which the work of the episcopate could be done. The Bishop of Norwich writes as a conservative, with all the conservative's eye for practical and common-sense reform, and with all that shrewd sympathy with the actualities of the parson's life which he has often shown in the Church Assembly. He values intensely the Church's national status. "I regard myself first as a Bishop in the Church of Christ, secondly as a Bishop of the Church of England, thirdly as the Bishop of this diocese. There is no contradiction between the words 'catholic' and 'national.'"

But it is the "national" aspect which provides him with his principal themes. He considers that the Church Assembly has fully justified its creation, but he utters a warning against too rapid legislation. We agree with the Bishop that there is a real danger of excessive centralization. The present Patronage measure is a case in point. It is easy to take too seriously the frequent, but ill-thought-out, demand that parishes should have a voice in the choice of their parsons. It is genuine, so far as it goes; but how far does it go? Is it really necessary to subject the patronage of bishops and of lay patrons, most of whom take infinite pains over their appointments, to the scrutiny of elaborately organized Patronage Boards? There is certainly need for reform. The Parochial Church Council might well be required to acquaint the patron with prescribed details as to the character of the parish and the work to be done in it. A register might well be kept in each diocese of clergy desirous to move. And there are other improvements which suggest themselves. But the creation of a cumbrous machinery in place of the simple, and

yet conscientiously worked, procedure which now exists is a policy of very doubtful wisdom.

One could wish that the Bishop of Norwich had dealt at greater length with the question of the appointment of bishops. The issue is not between Crown appointment and appointment by some body of Church-people: it is rather whether or not the forms which already surround Crown appointment—particularly the election and the confirmation—shall be re-animated so as to become realities. No one can say that the election is more than an empty form, so long as the penalties of *præmunire* attach to a refusal to elect, while the nominee could and would none the less be appointed by Letters Patent. The initiative would still rest with the Crown; but the Church would have a guarantee, corresponding to the relative independence it now exercises in regard to legislation, that men were not elevated to the episcopate who had not the qualities for the position. And it cannot be denied that that does occasionally happen.

E. G. Selwyn.

THE ODES OF SOLOMON

A FINAL SELECTION RENDERED INTO ENGLISH VERSE, WITH SUGGESTED TUNES, BY S. P. T. PRIDEAUX, D.D.

[Note.—*The earlier renderings were published in* Theology, IX., 219 f. (*October*, 1924), X., 46 ff. (*January*, 1925), *and* XI., 45 ff. (*July*, 1925).]

VII.

The Joy of the Lord

The Lord! The Lord! He is my joy,
In Him my heart doth rest;
A ready help is He; my path
Is of all paths the best.
His very Self He did reveal
By His simplicity;
I saw Him and I trembled not,
He gracious was to me.

Though great He made Himself like me,
In lowliness how kind!
My nature and my form did wear
That I might learn His mind;
Was reckoned and became as I
That I might put Him on,
Nor turn from Him and leave the path
On which His feet have shone.

All-knowing He, the Incorrupt,
Creator, all in all,
My weakness saw ere I was born
And knew that I should fall;
All-wise He knew and pitied me
In His abounding grace,
Gave me to take His sacrifice
And plead before His Face.

Sing out, ye Saints, to the Most High,
Your joyful news proclaim;
And ye who sing "The Lord shall come"
Go out to greet His name;
Come forth, ye seers, behold Him nigh,
He stands before you now;
With harp and voice sing ye His love
And low before Him bow.

Hatred and jealousy are gone
And ignorance is fled,
The knowledge of our gracious Lord
On all around is shed;
Our hearts are with His sunshine filled,
Our tongues His power confess;
His whole creation lifts its voice
To hymn His loveliness.

Tune, E.H., 379: Rusper.

VIII.

The Open Heart

Open your hearts to the joy of the Lord,
Let love fill your hearts and your lips overflow;
Bring Him a harvest, your holiness bring,
With tongues ever watchful His glory to show.

Ye who were humbled rise up and stand forth,
Ye silent ones tell how your tongues were set free;
The Lord is your helper, your peace was made sure
Or ever your war was, and mighty is He.

Hear now the word that the Truth would reveal,
Receive ye the knowledge the Most High imparts;
Flesh has not heard it, the word that He speaks,
Unknown is the message He brings to your hearts.

Keep ye My secret, by it are ye kept;
And keep ye My faith, for My faith keeps you;
My knowledge discern, ye who know Me in truth;
And love with affection where love is My due.

I know My own, and or ever they breathed
I took knowledge of them and on them set My sign;
I fashioned their limbs, they are all in My sight;
They drink of My milk, and their life it is Mine.

They are My work and the strength of My thoughts,
I took pleasure in them and am not put to shame;
Who shall assail them? At My right hand
I set My elect and they bear My Name.

Tune, E.H., 245: Quedlinburg.

XXXIII.

Grace

Return, return, ye sons of men,
And come, ye daughters, nigh;
Forsake corruption, turn to Me,
And listen to My cry.

The grace of God My message is,
That I may enter in
To make you wise in ways of truth
And save your souls from sin.

I am your Judge, by God's command,
And they who put me on
Shall have no hurt, but theirs shall be
My pure dominion.

My chosen ones they walk in Me,
And those that seek My Face
I make to trust My Holy Name,
And teach them all My ways.

To God the Father let us sing,
And to the Christ, His Son,
Who with the Eternal Spirit reign
For ever Three in One.

Tune, E.H , 490: St. Columba.

XL.

The Rapt Soul

Rich as is the sweetness
Of the honey-bee,
Full as is a mother's love,
So I hope in Thee.

As the rushing fountain,
So my brimming soul
Pours His praises, and my tongue
Doth His name extol.

Shining with His gladness,
In His love most dear
Triumphing, I give to Him
Trust and holy fear.

He gives life immortal,
Those who in it share
See nor death nor hell, but find
Sure redemption there.

Tune, Church Hymns, 574: North Coates.

XLI.

The New Song

Now praise the Lord, His children all,
His faith and truth confessing;
Each one He knows; we live in Him;
We sing His love and blessing;
His life He gives us in His Christ;
A day of wondrous story
Has shined on us, and great is He
Who gives us of His glory.

See, on the face of every child
There glows the heavenly splendour;
Come one and all in His great Name
His worthy praise to render.
By night and day shall His dear love
Be all our meditation;
We'll honour Him in His goodness,
His joy our exultation.

Amazed all those who look on me
Now of the heavenly city;
Father of Truth, He me begat,
Remembered in His pity;
Since time began have I been His,
He from the first possessed me;
His bounty now has given me life,
His loving thought has blessed me.

His Word is with us all our way,
He gives us life and healing;
Once humbled, now exalted high
Through His own righteous dealing
His Father's glory now He wears,
On us His radiance casting,
The Saviour, Son of God Most High,
The Word from everlasting.

One is the Christ, and known was He
Before the world's foundation,
For ever in His Name and Truth
To bring us men salvation.
All ye who love Him lift your hearts
And voices high before Him—
Hallelujah! Hallelujah!
A new song to adore Him.

Tune, E.H., 292: St. Gall.

REVIEWS

S. Aurelii Augustini Episcopi Hipponensis De Civitate Dei contra Paganos Libri XXII. Edited, with an Introduction and Appendices, by J. E. C. Welldon, D.D., Dean of Durham. 2 vols. S.P.C.K. 42s.

St. Augustine's City of God. A View of the Contents, by Joseph Rickaby, S.J. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 3s. 6d.

OF THE CITY OF GOD

The Dean of Durham has finished a great work. An edition of the *De Ciuitate Dei* of St. Augustine is comparable only with an edition of Dante or of Shakespeare, for the subject amounts to little less than the *omne scibile* of the writer's day and generation. And the *De Ciuitate* is the expression, reasoned and deliberate, of a great mind at a great epoch, an epoch of moral, intellectual and social reconstruction, direfully accentuated, for the average man in the street, by the destructive phenomenon of what was, in fact, an attack upon the civilization of the world at its very centre. Thus, in spite of its assured hope, its quiet confidence, the treatise reflects the atmosphere of an anxiety which, although it has passed away, was very real, very insistent, when present. Perhaps the Augustine—to speak in familiar terms—of post-war days was not quite the same person as the Augustine of an earlier period. Rome was sacked by Alaric and the Goths in A.D. 410; Augustine began the *De Ciuitate Dei* in A.D. 413 and ended it in A.D. 426; in a sense the treatise was his prophetic interpretation of a stupendous cataclysm. And in it he gathered up for consideration and for warning so much as he could of the immensity of human life; he gave, as he understood it—that is to say, as an educated Christian, instinct at once with human feeling and with religious awe—the Christian response to the appeal of the old world, the appeal of its priests, of its philosophers and of its poets. Indeed, it would often appear that he is not so much writing the *apologia* of the Church as coming to the rescue of that old world, that *ciuitas terrena*, which is only not the *ciuitas cælestis* because it is ruled by *amor sui usque ad contemtum Dei*;* his most lurid pictures of pagan morals do not fail to touch us with a sense of pity for the human race which, *cum in honore esset, non intellexit.* After all, at heart, Augustine is the friend of the prisoner in the dock, albeit he holds a brief, and a strong brief, for the Crown. And his method is beyond measure fair. We feel certain that he is taking the other side at its best.

* xiv. 28.

He calls upon great personalities, *clara et uenerabilia nomina*, Varro and Apuleius, Plotinus and Porphyry, to say nothing of the great master, Plato himself; they speak, and speak forcibly, from his pages. Nor does he fail to impress us with the conviction that when, for example, he is charging the old world and its religions with the shameless *nefanda* of phallic worship and the like, he is telling a story the details of which he would fain modify, if he could do so with a due regard to truth.

Dr. Welldon has admirably succeeded in emphasizing certain aspects of the treatise which have a vital bearing upon contemporary needs of to-day. Let us consider a few of them.

Religion is much more than a mere matter for the individual, for the simple reason that the individual is much more than an individual. This fact belonged essentially to the Roman, or shall we say Latin, ideal. Just as *salus rei publicæ* was a primary consideration for men of the old world like Cicero, so was it also for Augustine, only, for him, the *res publica* was the *Ciuitas Dei*. "Nostris enim uitiis," wrote Cicero, "non casu aliquo, rem publicam uerbo retinemus, re ipsa uero iam pridem amisimus"; but, argues Augustine, that never was a true *res publica*, seeing that in it was not that true righteousness which is to be found only in the *res publica* "cuius conditor rectorque Christus est." Thus righteousness is revealed as the mark of a Christian, because a Christian is a citizen of the *Ciuitas Dei*, and a splendour is cast upon the traditional CIVIS ROMANUS SUM, because *gloriosa dicta de te, ciuitas Dei*. All this is not to say that there is a trace of Erastianism about Augustine's view; nor should we be justified in regarding it as theocratic, for the *Ciuitas Dei* has no *forum externum* with coercive power, only a *forum conscientiæ*, instructed, certainly, and sanctioned by the moral authority of the *forum externum* of the whole body. Dr. Welldon discusses* the various opinions held by modern writers "as to the effect of the *De Ciuitate Dei* upon the general authority of the Church." Surely, for Augustine, the *Ciuitas Dei* was both an accomplished result and a process, and was, in either case, identified with the Church. He emphasizes the present reality of this accomplished result: "ergo et nunc ecclesia regnum Christi est regnumque cælorum . . . ecclesia quæ nunc etiam est regnum Christi."† He insists equally upon the process as still in course: "ædificatur enim domus Domino ciuitas Dei, quæ est sancta ecclesia. . . . Dei domus ædificatur in omni terra."‡ Over against this *ciuitas cælestis* stands the *ciuitas terrena*, human society in the broadest sense of the term, not merely the Empire or the Civil State, but the entire life of

* Pp. li. *sq.* † xx. 9. ‡ viii. 24.

the contemporary world, so far as it was organized independently of the motive of *amor Dei*, as it were the κόσμος in the Johannine sense.* And with Augustine independence of God is hostility to God, whether such independence be evidenced by mere disregard of His will or by deliberate preference of the *societas dæmoniorum* and of all the nameless horrors associated therewith,† or again by reasoning based upon the authority of philosophy, however distinguished and venerable the names of its exponents. Not that he would promise to the citizens of the City of God, by virtue of the *socialis uita sanctorum*, any immunity from the common ills that flesh is heir to; for the Lord's own words, *et inimici hominis domestici eius*, are in full accord with the teaching of such pagan writers as Terence and Cicero.‡ They were stormy days in which he lived: "quantus est metus, quanta calamitas ab orbitatibus adque luctu . . . ! Quis ambulat ubicumque non inopinatis subiacens casibus ?"§ And the solaces to which Augustine refers as "per sancta et sanctos" are not always granted to our prayers, "ne propter hoc religio quæratur, quæ propter aliam magis uitam, ubi mala non erunt omnino ulla, quærenda est."‖ Yet, in spite of the fact that the human race is by a just decree subject to misery, so that we should praise God for His righteousness revealed in punishment, life, by reason of the Incarnation, is full of blessings. Even as the original benediction, *Crescite et multiplicamini et inplete terram*, still holds good across the disaster of the Fall, so do there persist for the service of man the beauty and utility of all created things. "Iam cetera pulchritudo et utilitas creaturæ, quæ homini, licet in istos labores miseriasque proiecto adque damnato, spectanda adque sumenda diuina largitate concessa est, quo sermone terminare potest ?"¶ The whole context forms an eloquent summary of the wealth and wonder of nature, such as might have been penned by a humanist, and such, too, as recalls Augustine's own descriptions of the celestial state which awaits the final revelation of the divine glory hereafter.

> ". . . The whole earth
> The beauty wore of promise; that which sets
> The budding rose above the rose full blown."

It has been said that the Bible is the most unguarded of books, in that within its covers may be found strong statements on both sides of many questions. And Augustine, too, is unguarded; at one moment he will—to use Matthew Arnold's expressive phrases—Hebraize, and at another he will Hellenize. In the passage to which reference has just been made he Hellenizes.

* xiv. 28. † viii. 24. ‡ xix. 5.
§ xxii. 22 ‖ xxii. 22. ¶ xxii. 24.

When he comes to treat of "that great populace of 'little gods' dear to the Roman home . . . Vatican who causes the infant to utter his first cry; Fabulinus who prompts his first word; Cuba who keeps him quiet in his cot," he sees it—and, we must admit, at close quarters—in a very different light from that in which it appears in a modern work which we may regard as, in its own way, a powerful apology for the Christian faith.* After all, as Dr. Welldon points out, the Numidian Arnobius, a century before Augustine's day, had drawn as loathsome a picture of the functions of these "little gods" as we find in *De Ciuitate Dei*, vi. 9.† Are we to infer that the state of things amongst a mixed population like that of North Africa was worse than it was in the cities and villages of the Peninsula? Again, is Augustine always correctly informed? There is, for example some confusion in his mind between *Liber Pater*, the Greek Dionysus, and that other *Liber*, "qui marem effuso semine liberat,"‡ plainly a "little god." Fr. Rickaby refers to "the glamour of Roman polytheism" as never having been felt by us "as a present fascination before our eyes."§ It is, of course, difficult for us to realize its attraction; indeed, the sanction given to unspeakable turpitude by the worship of the *Mater Magna* fills us with horror.‖ But it is equally difficult for us to realize the psychical wrench involved in the passage from a life informed by the belief in an immemorial polytheism, embracing every domestic and social function, to a monotheism which, just because it is trinitarian, is more exacting than any other. Probably Augustine did realize this, and therefore puts his case as strongly as he can. His Hogarthian portraiture is a skilful weapon of destruction. But he goes deeper. He questions whether there is in what he calls, after Varro,¶ *theologia ciuilis*—which is practically the religion of the people, as distinct from *mythica*, that of the poets, and from *naturalis*, that of the philosophers—anything at all worthy of the name of *diuinitas*.**

What, we wonder, would have been his strictures upon the mascotism, the spiritualism, the psycho-analysis, the devil-worship of our day? Truth to say, he was so essentially the great "ecclesiæ lumen et oraculum" just because he imposed, with such uncompromising emphasis, upon an age made sick and sorry by disaster, and seeking blindly to explain to itself the meaning of its state, the claims of the one personal God, who is that supreme Trinity in which "tantum est una

* Walter Pater, *Marius the Epicurean*, i., p. 10.
† Arnobius, *Adu. Gent.*, iii., 10, iv. 7, etc.
‡ vii. 2. § St. Augustine's *City of God*, p. 29.
‖ vii. 26. ¶ vi. 5. ** vii. 1.

(*sc.* res) quantum tres simul, nec plus aliquid sunt duæ quam una."*

And this leads us to observe the admirable selection exercised by Dr. Welldon in the notes upon the great passages of the treatise which deal with the claims of past and current philosophical systems. As we know, Augustine's scholarship, fine and finished up to the standard to which it attained, was rather that of an *amateur* than of an *érudit*. In the sphere of philosophy generally, and specially in regard of the points at which philosophy, as at the time expounded, touched either sympathetically or antipathetically the Christian religion, he was undoubtedly a master. It is interesting to read his reflections upon the agnosticism of Varro, and to infer that it still had its professors: "sicut impetus errabundæ opinionis inpulerit, ita huc adque illuc, hinc adque illinc insiliunt et resiliunt, ut ipse Varro de omnibus dubitare quam aliquid adfirmare maluerit."† The more dogmatic pyrrhonists are met by a reasoning which, as Dr. Welldon reminds us, anticipates Descartes: "Quid si falleris? Si enim fallor, sum. Nam qui non est, utique nec falli potest: ac per hoc sum, si fallor. Quia sum ergo si fallor, quomodo esse me fallor, quando certum est me esse, si fallor."‡ Augustine had a profound respect for Plato; "excellentissima gloria claruit, qua omnino ceteros (*sc.* discipulos Socratis) obscuraret";§ and of the Platonists he can write: "Nulli nobis quam isti proprius accesserunt."‖ Similarly Aristotle is "uir excellentis ingenii et eloquio Platoni quidem impar, sed multos facile superans;" and the story is told of the Peripatetics walking up and down in the garden of the Apollo Lyceius at Athens. There is generous recognition of Plotinus, Iamblichus, Porphyry and Apuleius. And what is their capital crime? "Sed hi omnes et ceteri eiusmodi et ipse Plato diis plurimis esse sacra facienda putauerunt."¶ Dr. Welldon here refers us in his note to the magnificent passage in the *Laws*, iv., pp. 716 *sq.*, in which the Athenian stranger says: "And he who would be dear to God must, as far as is possible, be like Him and such as He is. Wherefore the temperate man is the friend of God, for he is like Him; and the intemperate man is unlike Him, and different from Him, and unjust"; and then proceeds, without any sense of incongruity, to urge the duty of sacrifice to the Olympian gods and to the gods of the State in "odd numbers and the first choice, and the things of lucky omen," while he allows that to the gods below may be rightly offered "everything in even

* St. Augustine, *De Trinit.*, vi. 10.
† vii. 17. ‡ xi. 26. § viii. 4.
‖ viii. 5. ¶ viii. 12.

numbers, and of the second choice, and of evil omen"!* Augustine instinctively felt the material disregard of righteousness implied in such teaching. To put it into the language of the schoolboy, that sort of thing is "not cricket," though doubtless its supporters quite thought that it was. And this shows the extent to which the Christian attitude was, at the time when the treatise was written, in advance of all contemporary sentiment as to such matters.

Augustine has, indeed, many messages which may well come home to us to-day. Not the least important is that which he addresses to the leisured classes of society. He is writing "de habitu et moribus populi Christiani,"† and he distinguishes three legitimate types of life, the *otiosum*, the *actuosum* and that *ex utroque compositum;* all are compatible with the faith and with the attainment of the eternal rewards, provided that—to use Dr. Welldon's apt paraphrase—it be taken into strict account "what is the doctrine that he (*sc.* the Christian) holds through his love of truth or the sacrifice that he makes through his sense of charitable duty." The *otiosus* is under obligation to use his leisure for the utility of his neighbour. His delight should be not in mere *iners uacatio*, but rather in "aut inquisitio aut inuentio ueritatis, ut in ea quisque proficiat et quod inuenerit ne alteri inuideat."

We recognize from time to time mystical language which in the writings of later theologians, such as St. Gregory and St. Bernard, became, as it were, technical. For example, the cause of the beatitude of the good angels is *adhærere Deo;* that of the misery of the fallen angels, *non adhærere Deo;* and beatitude and misery are alternatives only for the rational or intellectual creature, because it is only such a creature who can be blessed "ex illo, a quo creata est"; if a man were blessed *se ipso bono*, he could never be wretched, "quia non se potest amittere."‡

Augustine's attitude towards stage plays is well-known. He is aware of the religious sanction of their institution at Rome; "non hominum uitiis, sed deorum uestrorum iussis Romæ instituti sunt";§ probably it was just this fact which so strongly moved his anger against them. Dr. Welldon has dealt fully with the subject in *Appendix C*, in which he illustrates the "virulence of Augustine and other Christian writers" as compared with the "mildly sarcastic language" of Plato. With the latter the tragic poet and the mime generally were bad educators of youth; they provided poor stuff by way of pabulum for the mind, garbage in fact. With the former it was

* *Dialogues of Plato*, Jowett, vol. v., p. 289.
† xix. 19. ‡ xii. 1. § i. 32.

simply that the stage handed over the souls of men to the devil and his angels. It was a subject upon which the Christian Fathers Hebraized with a vengeance!

Dr. Welldon's *Appendices* are very valuable. They enable him to expand his footnotes, and, if we may say so, we sometimes feel that they need expansion. As regards *Appendix D* (Augustine's Theory of Sacrifice) Fr. Rickaby tells us that he is "in some disagreement with the Dean on the point of Sacrifice,"* but he does not tell us in what the disagreement consists. Evidently Dr. Welldon considers that modern scholars—his authorities do not, with the exception of Harnack, come down beyond the eighteenth century—have tended to read their own meanings into Augustine's words. But, surely, Fr. Rickaby's "word on the theology of the Mass"† is at once profoundly Scriptural and quite correctly interpretative of Augustine's teaching. "In forma Dei sacrificium cum Patre sumat, cum quo et unus Deus est, tamen in forma serui sacrificium maluit esse quam sumere. . . . Cuius rei sacramentum cottidianum esse uoluit ecclesiæ sacrificium, quæ cum ipsius capitis corpus sit, se ipsam per ipsum discit offerre,"‡ writes Augustine, in terms which might well be a comment upon the σῶμα δὲ κατηρτίσω μοι of the Epistle to the Hebrews.§

Another subject as to which one may venture to doubt whether Dr. Welldon has quite fairly presented Augustine's view is predestination. "In the fall of the first man the whole human race was involved. But God ordained one part of it *i.e.*, the City of Heaven, for honour and glory; the other part *i.e.*, the city of earth, for judgment and punishment."‖ Now, in the passage to which reference is made, what Augustine writes is this: "Ex illo enim futuri erant homines, alii malis angelis in supplicio, alii bonis in præmiis sociandi quamuis occulto Dei iudicio, sed tamen iusto."¶ One cannot but think that Dr. Welldon imports into the words more than is there.

The book contains an excellent bibliography, both of the complete works of Augustine, and of the text of the *De Ciuitate Dei*, but no *apparatus criticus* of the MSS. of the treatise. This last we think to be a *desideratum* in an edition of such undeniable importance.

In fairness to the purchaser, it should be mentioned that while the Introduction, Appendices, and Notes are admirably printed, the spelling of the Text calls for explanation. The reader, as a rule can easily make the correction, but he will naturally be irritated.

Fr. Rickaby's little book is delightful reading, and cannot fail to appeal to the general reader as well as to the student. Is he right in stating that *essentia* was "a new-coined word in

* P. 6. † P. 45. ‡ x. 20. § Heb. x. 5. ‖ P. xxiii. ¶ xii. 28 (27).

St. Augustine's age" ?* Does not Quintilian (viii. 3) attribute it to the inventive genius of Sergius Flauius, a great coiner of new words, and does not Seneca (*Ep.* 58) claim for it the sanction of Cicero himself? But really both Dr. Welldon and Fr. Rickaby have, indeed, sent us "gift-horses," and we are very grateful for many an hour of stimulating and pleasurable exercise. In an age in which one is suffocated by ephemerals it is good awhile to breathe the keener air which blows from the eternal hills.

WATKIN WILLIAMS.

SCIENCE RELIGION AND REALITY. Edited by Joseph Needham. Sheldon Press. 12s. 6d.

"Two extravagances: to exclude Reason, to admit only Reason." The well-known words of Pascal chosen as a motto for this valuable composite volume of essays by distinguished writers indicates that the contributors share in a common spirit, that of reverence at once for religion and for science, but pledge themselves to no common "platform." Since each contributor, with one exception, seems to have written independently of most of his associates, it is hard to attempt a characterization of the resulting book as a whole. I must be content to indicate the range of topics discussed and to make a few remarks about the individual essays. These remarks, I need not say, come from one who is necessarily an outsider in respect of most of the subjects of the essays, and may sometimes be based on unavoidable misconceptions. The ground covered is so extensive and the general level of the contributions so high that I recommend the book warmly to all who take an intelligent interest in any aspect of the problem of the relation between science and religion as both revelatory of an ultimate reality; a reader who does not find his account in one essay will be pretty sure to find it in others.

It would be a little ungracious to complain that though the title of the book suggests the discussion of a single problem, the inter-relation between religion, science, and reality, some of the writers tend to let one or even two members of this triad fall into the background. Thus the editor's own essay on *Mechanistic Biology and the Religious Consciousness* seems to me to say very little about religion and nothing to speak of about "reality." It is almost entirely a vivacious and interesting attack on Neo-Vitalism, pertinent enough as a contribution to biology, but, as it seems to me, not very relevant to theology or metaphysics, and not much more so to religion. On the other

* P. 54.

side, Dr. Oman's essay on *The Sphere of Religion* is of first-rate interest to the serious student of religion, but does not seem to have much to say about " science." The most sustained attempt to weld all the parts of the problem together in a unitary view is made by the Dean of St. Paul's in the *Conclusion*, but the Dean has the unique advantage of writing with the contributions of his colleagues before him.

The Preface, by Lord Balfour, has the proper merit of a Preface. It indicates the general character of the problems to be discussed without prejudging the solutions. Its main object is naturally to call attention to the striking way in which, during the last half-century, divines have become more alive to the rights of natural science and men of science to the impossibility of identifying " natural knowledge " with the whole of our apprehension of the real. The divine no longer pits the law and the prophets against the physicist and the geologist, and the best men of science no longer treat religion as an illusion which has, at best, the useful function of keeping " the masses " out of mischief.

The most interesting point in the essay to my own mind is that Lord Balfour definitely commits himself to the identification of physical reality with a Newtonian system of corpuscles devoid of all sensible qualities—in fact, with what one might call a " Democritean world," relegating the whole wealth of colour, sound, fragrance, savour, to the status of a " mental addition." This is certainly not the view of such an eminent natural philosopher as Professor Whitehead, and I suspect that it is not the real view of Professor Eddington, one of Lord Balfour's own collaborators in this volume. It seems, in fact, to be rather a survival from the middle of the last century than a position characteristic of the twentieth. Hence I could wish that Lord Balfour had indicated his reasons for insistence on it. I suspect that at bottom they are based on nothing more than the now happily discredited epistemological doctrine of representative perception, which has wrought so much harm ever since Descartes introduced it into modern philosophy, but is quite unable to defend itself against the shattering criticisms of both Neo-Thomists and Neo-realists.

Dr. Malinowski's treatment of *Magic, Science and Religion* is certainly one of the most timely features of the book, in view of the abuse regularly made by the anti-religious of real or alleged anthropological facts. The author fortunately writes not as a mere closet-student, but on the strength of close first-hand association with real " primitive " Melanesians. This gives special value to the evidence he produces to show that the so-called " primitive mind " really works very much on the same lines

as our own, and in particular that the " savage " discriminates science, magic, and religion about as clearly as we do ourselves. The arguments produced to show that neither science nor religion can be regarded as a development from a " primitive " magic appear to me conclusive. Magic, in fact, would seem from the first to have been specifically an attempt to deal with the exceptional and unusual situation, which cannot be successfully met by the already familiar methods applicable to the events which make up the familiar routine of life, and, as the author argues, it is discriminated from religion by being always directed to the utilitarian control of an individual exceptional situation (*i.e.*, it is primarily a thoroughly *secular* business). Still more important is Dr. Malinowski's refutation of the attempt of Durkheim and his followers to reduce " God " to an imaginary personification of the tribe or clan, and so to make the origins of religion purely racial. The argument has two sides, a positive and a negative. There are numerous social activities to which the " savage " himself ascribes no religious significance. And in the activities to which religious significance is attached the part of society is to reinforce a religious attitude already present to the individual mind. Hence, for example, the importance attached to performances connected with death. Dissolution is a danger to the individual, and the function of the prescribed ritual is to enforce and strengthen his own clinging to his personal existence against the fears arising from the individual experience of the ebbing of vitality. It is not the kinsmen but the dying man who is passing through the shattering experience; the purpose of the acts expected of the tribe or the kin is precisely that of the administration of the last sacraments, to fortify the dying man against terrors through which he, not the performers in the communal rite, is passing—in a word, " to strengthen his faith." I am glad also to read the forcible plea for the view that where tribal ceremonies are employed to give an impressive sanction to moral rules of living, the presence of a personal sense of right and wrong in the individual is presupposed. The object of the painful or startling ritual is not to create the sense of moral values, but quite strictly to reinforce it by a " sanction."

Dr. Singer, writing on the *Historical Relations of Religion and Science*, seems to me less satisfactory. He deals much too summarily with a very big subject and gives too much space to one or two dramatic episodes, like the burning of Bruno and the affair of Galileo, which I suspect to be also imperfectly understood. I cannot go into details here, but I must at least protest against some considerable misconceptions. There is really no shift in meaning when we pass from the use of the word φύσις in the early Greek philosophers to that of *natura* in Latin.

The real meaning of the title of the Hippocratean περὶ φύσεως is simply, "What man is made of," and the subject of Lucretius' poem *De Rerum Natura* is not "the origin of things"—on the Epicurean view there is nothing except atoms and void, and neither has any "origin"—but, once more, "What things are made of." It is hardly true, though Mr. Needham also falls into error here, that there is a natural antipathy between a spiritual philosophy and a "mechanistic" science, and that this is exemplified by the hostility of Plato to Democritus. There are *no* allusions in Plato to Democritus, and no certain allusion to the atomism of which Democritus was *not* the inventor. And, as the attempt of the *Timaeus* to give a mechanistic account of digestion, the movements of the heart and those of respiration, regarded as one single process, shows, Plato had no prejudices whatever against "mechanistic" explanations in biology, though he certainly had the strongest objections to any metaphysical theory which regarded mechanistic explanations as the last word about reality. In view of the known devotion of the Academy to mathematical ideals, it seems more probable that if Plato were living to-day he would be less sympathetic than Aristotle to "Neo-Vitalism," just as Descartes, for all his spiritualist metaphysics and genuine acceptance of Christianity, was the most resolute of "mechanists" in his biology.

As for the painful episodes of Bruno and Galileo, I submit that they are popularly misinterpreted. When we remember that Bruno was a monk who had broken convent, an avowed Arian, and a man who had made a formal avowal of Calvinism at Geneva, we should surely hesitate before we say that it was for Copernican views in astronomy that he was burned. From what we know of Rome in 1600, it seems hardly likely that a man would have been executed for Copernicanism if there had not been matters of a very different kind laid to his charge. The affair of Galileo, again, is rather a quarrel between one man of science of first-rate genius and a number of scientific fossils in academic chairs than a quarrel between religion and science. The Church came into the business accidentally, as charged with the general supervision of University education rather than as the custodian of religious truth. Nor should it be disguised that the quarrel was seriously aggravated by Galileo's departure from his original pledge not to teach Copernicanism officially, and that on some important issues he was not merely in the wrong, but had treated his opponents with inexcusable insolence. Neither party to the conflict really comes well out of the business. The Congregation of the Index put itself wholly in the wrong by assuming an authority it did not possess; Galileo throughout showed himself insincere, timorous, and bitter-tongued. His

intellectual greatness should not blind us to the moral littleness of his character. Dr. Singer would have seen the affair in a truer light if he had not, as he seems to have, an unjust contempt for medieval thought. He seems not to know that north of the Alps the work of discrediting the whole Aristotelian dynamics had already been done once for all by the scientific Ockhamists of Paris, Buridan and others. Traditionalism had been driven to its "last ditch" in the Italian Universities long before Galileo gave it the *coup de grâce*, and the work had been done by the "schoolmen" of the fourteenth century. Of course, this in no way detracts from the eminence of the man who positively provided the newer and better dynamic with its methods and its fundamental formulæ. I should hesitate to speak so strongly of Dr. Singer's injustice if the evidence from his silence about the fourteenth-century Ockhamists were not confirmed by his curious remark that, in spite of his scientific attainments, Roger Bacon does not appear to have been a conscious heretic. How much can a man know about Roger if he does not know that he regarded the prosecution of "experimental science" as actually *part* of the "defence of the faith"? Bacon is never tired of insisting on the point that Gog and Magog have been let loose, and that Antichrist is at hand. The Church must therefore master all the secrets of nature for the double purpose of hastening the conversion of the Gentiles and defeating the prodigies which will be performed by Antichrist at the head of his hosts.

I must pass very briefly over the eloquent essay of the distinguished Italian thinker Professor Aliotta on *Science and Religion in the Nineteenth Century*. I hope I am not showing disrespect for my eminent colleague when I say that I could wish he had been a little less eloquent and a little more explanatory. His general thesis appears to be that science progressively explodes all "dogmas," including even the dogma of the existence of God, but can never impair the vitality of religion. But exactly what is the "religion" which is immune from all the assaults of science? Has it any intellectual content indispensable to it, or is it a mere vague emotionalism? If it has any contact with reality it must involve some definite intellectual attitude. We cannot believe without believing *that* something is true, or at least as near the truth as humanity can reach. The moment you try to say what the something is, you are formulating a "dogma." We all know that every formula in physics or chemistry may possibly call for modification in the course of time; they are all "provisional." We do not denounce Newton or Einstein for dogmatism because they present us with definite formulæ. We do not bid the physicist cultivate his scientific emotions but make a clean sweep of his formulæ.

Why should we treat the divine so differently ? The divine himself is more alive than anyone else to the imperfection of his formulæ; the *essentia* or *quid sit* of God, according to him, is incomprehensible. But it does not follow that some propositions about God may not be definitely ruled out once for all as absurd or morally dangerous, and here there would seem to be a task which can only be discharged by the formulation of " dogmas."

Professor Eddington writes at once with authority and brilliance on the conception of the physical realm as it emerges from the line of thought which expresses itself in the general theory of Relativity. As a piece of exposition for the " general reader " his essay is masterly and demands to be widely known and studied. The main point, as far as it is possible to summarize, is that what the physicist calls his " world " is a selection of those features of reality which interest him because they can be brought into a connected *metrical* scheme. But the making of this selection does not in the least involve the denial that " reality" includes much which cannot be brought into the system at all. The point is made specially clear by the theory of Relativity, since it impresses it on us that the selection will be made along different lines by observers differently placed; there is no metrical scheme which imposes itself on all observers throughout the universe. Our selection depends on our position in space and time. Thus the reference to a living individual mind which physics seems at first to banish from its outlook recurs when we acknowledge what the basis of our fundamental metrical scheme is, and this suggests that it is at least possible that the fundamentally important thing in the world may be a relation between the human spirit and the divine spirit, which the physicist as such is helpless to detect. Physical science, then, is compatible with a living religion which it could of itself neither discover nor even suggest. For Professor Eddington is careful to avoid the error of supposing that the " vague pantheism " which he thinks Physics may suggest is a real religion by which a man can hope to live and die. I only regret that the essay should be disfigured by one or two incidental assumptions, really only relics of a discredited philosophy, which are not vital to its purpose and merely confuse the main argument. The chief of these is the reappearance of the notion of " representative perception." Professor Eddington is entangling himself in an unfortunate and superfluous confusion when he asserts that our perception of the external world is " indirect " and really a matter of inference, because certain processes have to occur, *e.g.*, in the retina and optic nerve and brain, if we are to see a colour. Unconsciously he writes as though I directly apprehend a state of my brain and infer the seen colour. The fact is exactly the reverse.

I *never* apprehend a process in my own brain; I apprehend blue or green as the colour of an external object and infer from this by a circuitous argument that something is happening or has happened in the unseen thing I call my retina or my cerebral cortex. That is, the events in the retina and cortex are "intermediate" in a physiological sense; in an epistemological sense the seeing of the colour is direct and there are *no* intermediate links. If it were not so, I could not know that a rose is red unless I first had knowledge of my own brain and retina. In fact, every one of us knew that roses are red before he knew that he had a brain or retina. To use the sound scholastic distinction, the visual apparatus (and the reflected ray of which the physicist treats) is the instrument *by which* we see the colour of things, not the object *which* is seen.

I have already said that the main contention of the Editor's contribution seems to me irrelevant to the student of religion. It is interesting to know that in the Editor's opinion vitalism is a superfluous speculation, and the processes which go on in living tissue are capable of complete statement in terms of physics and chemistry. And I take it we should all agree at once that it is at any rate a legitimate attempt to clothe them wholly in such terms without introducing any new indefinables or postulates into the study of biology. If we can do so it is all so much to the good, though a mere outsider like myself may be allowed to feel uncertain whether Mr. Needham's pæan of triumph over Driesch and Haldane may not be a little premature. It is interesting that some chemical substances only produced in nature by the living organism (*e.g.*, urea) have been manufactured in the laboratory. But is this *proof* that *all* such substances can be made in the laboratory? Is there no danger of trusting too much to induction by imperfect enumeration? No doubt the decision on the value of the induction must be left in the last event to the specialist, but there is always the danger of counting as qualified specialists only those who agree with yourself.

In any case, I do not see that the question has much bearing on religion. Mr. Needham certainly ends by making it irrelevant, since he insists that though life may be explained in physical and chemical terms, no such explanation is possible for mind. In more old-fashioned terminology, though he declines to believe in the *anima intuitiva* and *anima sensitiva*, he believes very strongly in the *anima rationalis*, and it is with this that religion has its concern. I have already remarked that Mr. Needham's historical perspective is a little distorted. Apart from the general misconception that divines and idealist philosophers are professionally biassed in favour of vitalism, it is a little odd to

find the disreputable bishop Samuel Parker cited as an authority in order to make out a case for the view that theology as such had a quarrel with Descartes, and to hear that Cudworth, who did oppose Descartes, was a Professor of Medicine at Oxford!

Dr. Oman's essay on the *Sphere of Religion* is instructive if, at times, a little hazy. On the negative side the writer is, I think, successful in showing that most of the current and well-known attempts to say just what the sphere of religion is are open to unanswerable criticism. But it is not quite so clear to my own mind what Dr. Oman's own positive view is. I gather from p. 284 that he would define religion as that which has to do with the "sacred," the sacred meaning what Otto has called the "numinous" in so far as the numinous is not merely *felt* as the "supernatural" and "otherworldly," but also judged to have absolute worth. This distinction between the merely "holy" in Otto's sense, and the "sacred" seems to me to be of great importance, provided that it is not made too hard and fast. I presume we might say that whatever is felt as "absolutely other" is felt as belonging not merely to "another world" but to the "eternal" world, and thus that the feeling of the "numinous" even in its crudest forms involves an *implicit* judgment of absolute worth. The really "sacred," then, would be that which is not only felt as of absolute worth, but can maintain its absolute worth against all analysis and criticism, that which steadily affirms itself as of absolute value throughout human experience. This I understand to be Dr. Oman's own view. In any case he does a service by insisting on the two important points that we must not confuse religion with theology as we should be doing if we supposed that the awareness of the supernatural is given apart from, not in, "the sense of the holy and the judgment of the sacred," and again that the reality of the supernatural implies and is implied by the reality of the natural. (This is against all attempts to reduce the natural and temporal to "illusion.")

Dr. William Brown's brief essay on *Religion and Psychology* has special interest from the conception thrown out in it of the relation between "suggestion" and faith. Dr. Brown's view, suggested apparently by his own experience as a practitioner of healing by suggestion, is that suggestion, including auto-suggestion, does not work directly. Its value is due to the fact that it throws the patient's mind into a passive condition in which faith gets a chance to produce its effect unimpaired by inhibitions. Faith is the normal attitude of volition, volition being "a wish or desire accompanied by the judgment, affirmation, or belief that we shall fulfil the desire." Suggestion does not of itself

effect any result, but by banishing conflicting "associations" it creates a situation favourable for the affirmation that we are going to fulfil our desire. Faith itself is the "affirmation of the *entire* mind." Along these lines, with the added view that all personality except that of God is imperfect, Dr. Brown works out an interesting view of the mystic way as the supreme development of faith and the vital core of living religion. It is reassuring to find a specialist like Dr. Brown making as light as he does of the "Oedipus complex," which, as he says, is not really found by the Freudian in the facts he analyzes, but read into them as a postulate. One wonders, by the way, whether if Freud had happened to be more familiar with the *Choephori* than with the *Oedipus*, we might not have a popular theory explaining all pathological nervous and mental conditions by a supposed punitive desire of babies to kill their mothers? I imagine the facts would lend themselves as well to the notion of an "*Orestes* complex" as to any other.

Professor C. C. J. Webb's few pages on *Science, Christianity and Modern Civilization* raise the fundamental issue of the place of the historical element in religion. Can we anticipate the development of a "universal religion" which will be neither Christianity nor any other of the great historical religions, though it is their completion and synthesis? Professor Webb pleads that at least such a universal religion would be in its worship and theology more truly continuous with Christianity than with any other historical religion. Again, within Christianity itself, what truth is there in the conception of an "historic deposit"? The author's answer seems to be that there must be some such kernel of the historical, but at the same time, as we see in the instances both of the Reformation and the Anglo-Catholic movement, the attempt to revert to a real or supposed primitive type involves for its success appropriation of new elements belonging to contemporary civilization. One only regrets that Professor Webb has been precluded from developing the theme further and discussing what, after all, is the practical question of moment—What at this present is the kernel of tradition which we cannot afford to surrender without compromising the substance of faith?

It is just on this same point that I could have wished for some guidance in the concluding essay, where the Dean of St. Paul's weighs his fellow contributors in the balance. The Dean writes, as he always does, with insight and sympathy and in the noblest mystical spirit—that is, in the spirit of one who knows that the thing at the root of all religion is a life, not a theory or a philosophy, a "walking with" the Eternal and Unseen. It will come as no surprise to students of his books to find him send-

ing us to sit at the feet of Fechner as well as of Plotinus. But I could wish he had tried, like St. Augustine, to answer the question what it is in the Christian religion which cannot be got from the "Platonists" but is specifically Christian. Just what is it which is "revealed"? The Dean comes up to the very point at which the question forces itself on one, and then, as it seems to me, he averts his gaze. Incidentally it is curious and interesting to find him asserting, and giving reasons for the assertion, that there is still a real clash between science and the Creeds about the Copernican astronomy. It is like Dr. Inge, and one is grateful to him for it, that he enjoys making us uncomfortable by rousing us from the illusions of self-complacency. But I should not have thought the particular difficulty he raises very serious. In the days when Copernicanism was thought theologically dangerous the supposed danger lay, I apprehend, not so much in the impossibility of finding a local place in the universe for "heaven" and the "right hand of the Father" (the difficulty if it had ever been felt could equally be real with a pre-Copernican astronomy), but in the assumed bearing of the new astronomy on Christological problems. If the earth is a planet, it was felt, we may reasonably expect that the other planets also will contain rational mortal animals. But Christian theology knows only of one such set of beings, those who fell in Adam and were redeemed by Christ. Whether anyone really feels this to be a theological difficulty to-day I do not know. I am inclined to think, with a late distinguished theologian of Maynooth, that if the Church has ever as a whole committed itself badly, it was when the Council of Vienne seemed to lay it down as part of the Faith that the soul is the "substantial form" of the body, a proposition which I suspect of being either senseless or false, if taken as it stands.

A. E. Taylor.

NOTICES

THE ASCENT OF MAN. By Arthur Machin. Longmans, Green and Co. 7s. 6d.

The author's aim in this book has been to examine critically the general theory of evolution, with special reference to humanity. He assumes the truth of Spencer's statement that man can only be understood by regarding him as the direct descendant of savage ancestors, and he devotes much of the book to a criticism of Darwin's opinions, especially in their relations with Malthusianism. He then goes on to apply the resulting formulæ to the ascent of man, and this part of the book he summarizes as Spencer's Social Statics interpreted by the Origin of Species. His conclusions are of some interest to the theologian, for they lead to the derivation of the precepts of ethics and moral theology from quite biological considerations. His conclusions and opinions are temperately and judiciously put forward, as a rule also in such a way as to carry conviction. He does not altogether avoid the usual confusion between origin and value, for on p. 321 he says: "The principle of natural selection . . . explains man to himself. It shows him what he is, and why he is what he is." We fear, with Professor A. E. Taylor, that "you neither explain what a thing is by saying how it has come to be there, nor explain how it has come to be there by saying what it is." Nevertheless, Mr. Machin has produced a stimulating book, though one is not quite sure how much of it is absolutely new.

JOSEPH NEEDHAM.

THE NON-RATIONAL CHARACTER OF FAITH. By the Rev. E. E. Thomas, M.A., D.Litt. Longmans, Green and Co. 6s.

Dr. Thomas here gives us the latest attempt to support religion by a reasoned mistrust of reason. A competent philosopher, he writes freshly and clearly. His book will interest and stimulate students of the philosophy of religion. His standpoint can be illustrated by quotations. "The world as built up by philosophic speculation does not contain anything in the nature of ultimate values . . . it is through and through contingent and relative . . . in no way can it give satisfaction to man's desire for the abiding presence of God and the eternal stability of his own soul" (p. 21). "When religion allows herself to become reasonable, she forsakes the highroad of the unconditional and becomes a mere philosophy of life" (p. 86). As a protest against the effort to represent religion as an undeveloped form of philosophy, and as insisting on religion as a distinct and autonomous strain in human experience, the book is timely and valuable. Its value would be increased by some reference to other writers on the same subject. But it leaves us quite in the dark as to the basis of religious certainty. Is it merely uncriticized feeling? How, then, can one form of religion be better than another? And, again, if God made the world, does it not in the least reflect His nature? We still believe that the goal of this kind of defence of religion is a bottomless scepticism. Man must be both rational and religious, or he will not long remain religious.

E. J. BICKNELL.

CHRIST IN HIS CHURCH. By William Temple, Bishop of Manchester. Macmillan. 3s. 6d.

This admirable book, which deserves as wide a circulation as possible, especially among the clergy, consists of the Bishop of Manchester's Primary Charge to the clergy of his diocese, divided into eight addresses, which were given at various centres to the clergy of the different deaneries. In it profound thought is clothed in clear and simple language, a combination unhappily rare; its steady grasp of different aspects of a question, sometimes a highly controversial question, is combined with a deep spirituality, a setting of first things first, which cannot be too highly commended.

The first address is an exposition of the Bishop's philosophy of four grades of being—Matter, Life, Mind, and Spirit—the highest being akin to God, and each using the one below as its vehicle, which is applied to the Church as the vehicle of the power of God Incarnate. In the second address the principle of the Incarnation is set forth in Miracle, Sacrament, and Vocation, in opposition to the common pantheistic conception of God, and we are warned not to make the smallest concession on the principle of the Miraculous. In the third address the Bishop contrasts the Catholic and Evangelical traditions in the English Church (he denies that there is any distinctively religious Liberal tradition, and deprecates organizations of "Liberal Churchmen"). The special dangers of each tradition and their necessity to one another are expounded. The Bishop approves of non-communicating attendance, but not of Masses without any to communicate with the priest; of reservation, but not organized "devotions." The fourth address deals with the history of the relations between Church and State, each of which exercises Divine authority, but in different spheres and manners. The question of establishment is of much more importance to the State than to the Church. The fifth address maintains the importance of individual liberty in a democratic system, and admirably explains the different functions of laity and clergy in council. The sixth deals with the Church's duty to international politics, the League of Nations, and the cause of charity between nations, even in war-time. The seventh is concerned with the local problems of religion in Lancashire; the eighth urges the clergy to teach their people more carefully the methods of the devotional life.

We differ from the Bishop on some incidental points. On p. 51 he does not recognize that in many parishes not to "discourage" communion at the late Eucharist would encourage the old lazy and formalist practice of "stopping the second service," and make it intolerably long; on p. 71 he does not see that those who believe in lifelong marriage cannot live in a community which regards it as temporary, and that if the State altogether rejects the Christian standard Christians will be forced to live separately, as in heathen and Moslem countries, or else see Christian morals irretrievably ruined; on p. 109 his description of the theory of Divine Right in Stuart times is hardly fair to the ideals of the "Eikon Basilike."

C. BEAUFORT MOSS.

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